## Facts

- Thomas F. and Ronna L. Loppnow conveyed Alabama real property to William and Judy Buxton by deed prepared by Ernest W. Ball & Associates, Inc.
- The deed’s granting language conveyed the property to the Buxtons “for and during their life and upon their death, then to their heirs in fee simple,” also referencing contingent remainders and reversionary interests.
- Other deed language, including warranty phrasing referring to the Buxtons’ “heirs, executors and assigns,” appeared inconsistent with a life-estate conveyance.
- The Buxtons filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration that the deed granted them a fee simple estate with a right of survivorship, arguing the deed was ambiguous.
- A guardian ad litem, Christopher M. Priest, was appointed to represent unknown heirs who could take under the deed’s remainder language.
- The trial court entered summary judgment for the Buxtons, finding ambiguity and construing the deed in favor of a fee simple with survivorship.
- Priest appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the deed’s granting clause was ambiguous as to the estate conveyed to the Buxtons.
2. Whether allegedly inconsistent warranty language could alter or enlarge an otherwise clear grant.
3. Whether the statutory presumption favoring fee simple applied, permitting construction of the deed as granting the Buxtons fee simple with survivorship.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment and remanded.
- The court held the granting clause unambiguously conveyed a life estate to the Buxtons, with a remainder in fee simple to their heirs.
- The court held that inconsistent or inapt warranty language did not create ambiguity sufficient to override the clear granting clause.
- Because the deed clearly expressed a lesser estate, the statutory presumption favoring fee simple did not apply.

## Legal Principles

- The granting clause controls the determination of the estate conveyed when its language is clear.
- Boilerplate or inconsistent language in other deed clauses (including warranty provisions) cannot contradict or expand a clear grant.
- A presumption that a deed conveys fee simple applies only when the deed does not clearly express a lesser estate; clear life-estate language defeats the presumption.
- Traditional phrasing granting property “for and during [the grantee’s] life” followed by a gift over “upon [the grantee’s] death” is treated as unambiguous creation of a life estate with a remainder.

## Conclusion

The court construed the deed according to its clear granting clause, holding the Buxtons received only a life estate and that the remainder passed in fee simple to their heirs; the trial court’s contrary construction based on perceived ambiguity and fee-simple presumption was reversed and the case remanded.


Priest v. Ernest W. Ball & Assocs., Inc., 62 So. 3d 1013 (Ala. 2010)