## Facts

- Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968.
- The Brady Act directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system and, during an interim period, required local “chief law enforcement officers” (CLEOs) to perform specified tasks for handgun purchases.
- Interim duties included receiving forms, checking records for disqualifications, and informing firearms dealers whether a transfer was prohibited.
- Jay Printz (Montana sheriff) and Richard Mack (Arizona sheriff) sued in their official capacities, challenging the interim CLEO mandates as unconstitutional federal compulsion of state officers.
- Federal district courts found the background-check mandate unconstitutional but severable; the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the interim provisions.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.

## Issues

1. Whether Congress may require state and local executive officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program by performing mandatory background checks and related tasks.
2. Whether the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to impose such obligations on state executive officials.
3. Whether the Brady Act’s interim CLEO requirements violate the Tenth Amendment’s federalism structure.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 5–4 decision.
- The Court held unconstitutional the Brady Act provision commanding CLEOs to conduct background checks during the interim period.
- The Court also invalidated mandatory tasks logically dependent on that command (including the compelled acceptance and processing of forms).
- The Court did not invalidate the Brady Act in its entirety and left room for voluntary state participation.

## Legal Principles

- Congress may not compel States, or their political subdivisions’ officers, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program absent specific constitutional authorization.
- The anti-commandeering rule applies to state executive officials as well as state legislatures and is supported by constitutional structure, historical practice, and accountability concerns.
- The Supremacy Clause permits federal law to bind state courts in appropriate circumstances, but it does not authorize federal direction of state executive officers to execute federal law.
- The Necessary and Proper Clause does not supply power to directly require state governments to implement federal regulatory commands.
- States may voluntarily cooperate with federal programs; the constitutional defect is federal compulsion, not coordinated enforcement by choice.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the Brady Act’s interim requirement that local chief law enforcement officers conduct handgun background checks and perform related mandatory tasks violated the Tenth Amendment because Congress cannot conscript state executive officials to carry out federal regulatory programs.


Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)