## Facts

- Pritchard purchased a parcel of real property near (and described as bounded by) a railroad line from Rebori by warranty deed that included a covenant against encumbrances.
- Before the sale, both Pritchard and Rebori inspected the premises and treated a railroad fence on the ground as marking the boundary of the railroad’s right-of-way.
- Rebori had the land surveyed, and the survey (and resulting deed description) tied the parcel’s boundary to the railroad right-of-way as located by the fence.
- After the conveyance, Pritchard learned that the railroad’s true right-of-way line was not at the fence; the legal right-of-way extended farther into the parcel described in the deed.
- When Pritchard began constructing a warehouse in reliance on the deed’s description, the railroad notified him that the construction encroached on the railroad’s existing right-of-way.
- To remove the problem and proceed with his planned use, Pritchard acquired other land and conveyed it to the railroad in exchange for the strip within the right-of-way that overlapped the deed description (the railroad then released/quitclaimed that strip to him).
- Pritchard sued Rebori for damages for breach of the covenant against encumbrances, seeking recovery based on what he had to give up to clear the title.
- The trial court entered judgment for Pritchard, and Rebori appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Whether the deed’s boundary description, which referred to the railroad right-of-way but was drafted using the fence location, should be construed to stop at the railroad’s true right-of-way line (eliminating any encumbrance) or to cover the land described even though part lay within the railroad’s preexisting right-of-way.
2. If the deed is construed to describe land burdened by the railroad’s preexisting right-of-way, whether that right-of-way is an encumbrance that breaches the grantor’s covenant against encumbrances.
3. Whether Pritchard could recover damages based on the reasonable cost and value of what he conveyed to the railroad to clear the encumbrance affecting the land described in his deed.

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Pritchard.
- The court treated the deed as a “particular” description that Pritchard was entitled to rely on, even though the parties (and the survey) mistakenly assumed the fence marked the railroad’s right-of-way boundary.
- Because the land described in the deed extended into the railroad’s existing right-of-way, the right-of-way burdened the premises described and was an encumbrance at the time of conveyance.
- The encumbrance breached Rebori’s covenant against encumbrances, and Pritchard could recover damages tied to the reasonable expense and value of what he had to provide to the railroad to obtain the needed release for the affected strip.

## Legal Principles

- In construing deed boundaries, courts commonly look first to natural objects, then artificial monuments, then adjacent boundaries, and then courses and distances; however, this ordering is not an absolute rule and yields where needed to carry out the parties’ intent as shown by the deed read as a whole.
- A deed’s descriptive language is interpreted to give effect to the transaction the parties set out in the instrument; the court does not rewrite a deed after the fact to avoid an encumbrance when the adopted description, reasonably read, calls for the disputed land.
- A preexisting railroad right-of-way (or similar easement) is an encumbrance on the land it burdens and can breach a covenant against encumbrances when the deed describes the burdened strip without an exception.
- A grantee who reasonably incurs expense or transfers value to remove such an encumbrance may recover damages measured by the reasonable cost of clearing the title so the grantee can use the land as the deed purported to convey it.

## Conclusion

Because Rebori’s deed description—based on the fence location—described a parcel that overlapped the railroad’s already-existing right-of-way, the right-of-way was an encumbrance on the premises described and breached the covenant against encumbrances; Pritchard was therefore entitled to damages measured by the reasonable value of what he gave the railroad to obtain the release needed to clear the title.


Pritchard v. Rebori, 186 S.W. 121 (1916)