## Facts

- Andrew S. Prousi bought a new Cruisers yacht on April 11, 1995, from Greenwich Boat Works, an authorized Cruisers dealer in New Jersey.
- Cruisers (a division of KCS International, Inc.) manufactured the yacht’s hull and installed various systems; the yacht’s engines were manufactured and separately warranted by Crusader Marine Engines.
- Cruisers issued a written limited warranty for the yacht that, among other things, required customers to have warranty work performed through the selling dealer (or another authorized dealer), and contained language intended to limit or exclude implied warranties.
- After the yacht was launched in May 1995, Prousi experienced mechanical problems during travel from New Jersey to Delaware and then to Maryland, including stalling and other performance issues.
- Prousi reported problems to the dealer and also communicated with Cruisers; Cruisers sent replacement parts at no charge and indicated it would reimburse certain repair costs through the dealer.
- Months later, Prousi hired a mechanic in Annapolis to inspect the engines. The mechanic found rust and sticking valves in the starboard engine and attributed the condition to water intrusion through the exhaust system installed on the yacht.
- Prousi informed Cruisers of the engine condition. Cruisers responded that the engine was covered by Crusader’s warranty and directed Prousi to Crusader.
- About ten days after being referred to Crusader, Prousi sued Cruisers (and also named Crusader), asserting warranty-based claims, including claims under the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, tied to alleged failure to repair or replace and to alleged defects connected to the yacht’s systems.

## Issues

1. Whether Cruisers was entitled to summary judgment because Prousi did not satisfy the warranty’s requirement that repairs be performed through the selling authorized dealer (a claimed condition precedent to coverage).
2. Whether Cruisers’ conduct (sending parts, coordinating repair efforts, and offering reimbursement) could support a finding that Cruisers waived strict enforcement of the dealer-repair requirement.
3. Whether genuine fact disputes existed on causation and responsibility—particularly whether the alleged water intrusion was tied to the yacht’s exhaust system installed by Cruisers, even though the engine itself was separately warranted by Crusader.
4. Whether Prousi sued before Cruisers had a reasonable opportunity to perform under its warranty (or whether Cruisers’ referral to Crusader could be treated as a refusal to perform).
5. Whether Prousi’s implied-warranty theories could proceed in light of the warranty language and applicable Pennsylvania warranty rules.

## Decision

- Cruisers’ motion for summary judgment was denied as to Prousi’s express-warranty and Magnuson–Moss theories to the extent they turned on disputed facts about the scope of Cruisers’ obligations, waiver of procedural requirements, causation, and whether Cruisers failed to honor its warranty commitments.
- The court held that the dealer-repair requirement could not be enforced on summary judgment as an absolute bar where the record permitted competing inferences about waiver and about Cruisers’ own participation in troubleshooting and repairs.
- The court found that disputes about the source of the engine damage (including evidence tying the condition to water intrusion connected to the yacht’s exhaust system) presented fact questions not suitable for resolution under Rule 56.
- The court also declined to resolve, as a matter of law, whether Prousi’s suit was premature or whether Cruisers effectively refused warranty performance by directing him elsewhere.
- The court granted summary judgment for Cruisers on Prousi’s implied-warranty theories based on the warranty’s limiting/disclaimer language and the governing limits on implied-warranty recovery in this manufacturer-consumer setting.

## Legal Principles

- A written warranty may set procedures for obtaining warranty service (including use of authorized dealers), but enforcement can turn on fact questions where the warrantor’s conduct suggests it did not insist on strict compliance.
- Waiver can be shown by conduct inconsistent with a claimed condition precedent, such as direct dealings with the customer, supplying parts, authorizing or funding repairs, or otherwise treating the warranty as active despite imperfect compliance.
- Summary judgment is inappropriate where the record supports competing inferences about (a) what caused the failure, (b) whether the manufacturer’s workmanship or installed systems contributed to damage in a separately warranted component, and (c) whether the warrantor failed to perform promised repair or replacement.
- Whether a buyer gave a reasonable opportunity to cure, and whether a warrantor’s response amounted to a refusal to perform, commonly depends on disputed facts and communications between the parties.
- Under Pennsylvania warranty law, implied-warranty recovery may be barred where the governing documents effectively limit or disclaim implied warranties and the legal requirements for asserting implied warranties against a manufacturer are not met.

## Conclusion

The court refused to end the case on summary judgment where the record could support findings that Cruisers waived strict dealer-repair procedures, that defects tied to Cruisers-installed systems contributed to the engine condition, and that Cruisers did not properly perform under its warranty or under Magnuson–Moss; however, it entered summary judgment for Cruisers on implied-warranty theories that were foreclosed by the warranty’s limiting language and applicable Pennsylvania rules.


Prousi v. Cruisers Division of KCS International, Inc., 975 F.Supp. 768 (1997)