Facts
- Paul J. Huber bought a two-story frame house in Bayfield County, Wisconsin, intending to move it and its contents to Madeline Island in Lake Superior.
- Huber hired a transporter to move the house by truck-trailer across the frozen surface of Lake Superior.
- In March 1977, about three-fourths of the way to the island, the truck, trailer, house, and contents broke through the ice, leaving the house partially submerged.
- An underwater contractor proposed sinking the structure to the lake bottom to protect it from further ice damage until it could be raised when weather allowed.
- Huber and his insurer agreed, and the house was lowered to the lake bottom using sandbags placed on the floor.
- In May 1977, Gerald J. Provost, a commercial diver, was contacted by the underwater contractor and agreed to assist in retrieving the building; no specific compensation terms were agreed upon.
- Provost spent about sixty hours underwater removing sandbags from inside the house.
- While Provost was away recharging his air tanks and absent from the jobsite, the underwater contractor attempted to raise the structure; the attempt caused the house to break apart and be totally destroyed through no fault of Provost.
- The contractor retrieved most of the debris and disposed of it in a landfill at a cost of $500 to Huber and his insurer.
- Provost billed Huber $500 for his work, but Huber refused to pay; Provost then filed suit in federal court seeking a maritime salvage award (claiming $10,000) under admiralty jurisdiction.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and Provost appealed.
Issues
- Does federal admiralty jurisdiction extend to a claimed maritime salvage award for efforts to recover a house that sank through lake ice and was intentionally weighted to the bottom pending later recovery?
- Is a house (and the truck-trailer transporting it over ice) “maritime property” or a “vessel” such that salvage law applies, and is there a sufficient connection to traditional maritime activity to support admiralty jurisdiction?
Decision
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The court held the house was not a ship, vessel, or other maritime property that can be the subject of a salvage claim.
- The court rejected the argument that the truck-trailer should be treated as a “vessel,” reasoning that the transport occurred over ice rather than as water transportation.
- Because the claim lacked the required connection to traditional maritime activity and did not involve salvage of maritime property, admiralty jurisdiction was absent.
Legal Principles
- Admiralty jurisdiction over tort-like occurrences requires more than location on navigable waters; the events must be connected to traditional maritime activity.
- Salvage is a maritime remedy limited to saving ships, vessels, or other maritime property in marine peril; non-vessel structures are generally not subjects of salvage.
- A “vessel” is defined as a watercraft or artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. (1 U.S.C. § 3)
- Federal subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be created by labeling an ordinary payment dispute as a “salvage” action when the underlying property and activity are non-maritime.
Conclusion
Because Provost’s work related to a residential house moved across frozen Lake Superior by land vehicles and later destroyed during recovery efforts, the case did not involve salvage of a vessel or other maritime property and did not bear a sufficient connection to traditional maritime activity; the Eighth Circuit therefore affirmed dismissal for lack of admiralty jurisdiction.