## Facts

- Jean Francois Pugin, a lawful permanent resident and citizen of Mauritius, pleaded guilty in Virginia state court to accessory after the fact to a felony.
- He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, with 9 months suspended.
- The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging he was removable as a noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony.”
- The asserted aggravated-felony category was “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S).
- Pugin argued his conviction did not qualify because the Virginia offense did not require a nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation or judicial proceeding.

## Issues

1. Whether an offense qualifies as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) only if it requires a nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation or judicial proceeding.
2. Whether a conviction for accessory after the fact may fall within § 1101(a)(43)(S) when the offense can be committed before any investigation or proceeding is pending.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held, 6–3, that an offense may “relate to” obstruction of justice under § 1101(a)(43)(S) even if it does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending.
- The Court concluded that Virginia’s accessory-after-the-fact offense qualifies as an offense relating to obstruction of justice for aggravated-felony purposes.
- The Court reversed the judgment below and remanded.
- The Court declined to apply the rule of lenity because it found no grievous ambiguity after applying ordinary interpretive tools.

## Legal Principles

- In § 1101(a)(43)(S), “relating to” is a broadening term that extends coverage beyond a narrow set of obstruction offenses.
- “Obstruction of justice,” for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(S), can include interference with the administration or process of justice even absent a pending investigation or proceeding (e.g., aiding a suspect to evade arrest or punishment).
- The aggravated-felony inquiry proceeds categorically by comparing the elements of the offense of conviction to the generic federal definition as construed.
- The rule of lenity in this context applies only upon a finding of grievous ambiguity after exhausting traditional tools of statutory interpretation.

## Conclusion

The Court interpreted § 1101(a)(43)(S) to cover obstruction-related offenses that impede the process of justice without requiring a pending investigation or proceeding, allowing removal based on accessory-after-the-fact and similar convictions.


Pugin v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1833 (2023)