## Facts

- Margrethe May Pyeatte (wife) and H. Charles Pyeatte (husband) married in Tucson, Arizona, on December 27, 1972; both had bachelor’s degrees.
- The wife worked as coordinator of the surgical technical program at Pima College; the husband had been one of her students.
- In early 1974, the spouses discussed further schooling and reached an oral understanding: the wife would financially support the husband through three years of law school so he would not have to work, and after graduation the husband would financially support the wife so she could obtain a master’s degree without working.
- The husband attended law school in Tucson from 1974 until graduation and was admitted to the Arizona bar shortly thereafter.
- During the first two years of law school, the wife supported both spouses with her salary.
- During the husband’s third year, the wife lost her job and the couple lived on savings; both contributed to those savings, but the wife contributed more.
- After the husband graduated and began working for a law firm, his income was not sufficient to cover living expenses and fund the wife’s graduate program; the spouses agreed to defer the wife’s education until they became financially stable, and the wife took part-time work as a teacher.
- Soon after, the husband told the wife he no longer wished to remain married, and the wife filed for dissolution.
- The trial court found a valid, binding agreement that the husband breached and awarded the wife $23,000 as damages for breach of contract.
- The husband appealed, challenging (1) contract enforceability and (2) whether the wife could recover anything on a restitution/unjust enrichment theory.

## Issues

1. Was the spouses’ oral education-support understanding sufficiently definite to be enforceable as a contract supporting a damages award in the dissolution decree?
2. If the understanding was not enforceable as a contract, could the wife recover restitution for unjust enrichment based on her support of the husband’s legal education where the dissolution followed shortly after the degree was obtained?

## Decision

- The court held the oral understanding was not enforceable as an express contract because essential terms were not stated with enough certainty (including details tied to the wife’s proposed schooling and the nature, timing, and scope of the husband’s promised support).
- The court held that, despite the lack of an enforceable contract, the wife could seek restitution to prevent unjust enrichment where her contributions toward the husband’s education were substantial and went beyond ordinary marital support, and the marriage ended soon after the husband obtained the benefit.
- The court reversed the contract-based award and remanded for proceedings consistent with restitution principles (including determining the proper restitution measure and any offsets).

## Legal Principles

- An agreement is not enforceable as a contract unless its material terms are reasonably certain; an oral marital plan for sequential schooling may fail for indefiniteness when key terms (timing, duration, cost, scope of support) are left open.
- Restitution (unjust enrichment; contract implied-in-law) may provide recovery even when no contract is enforceable, when one party received a measurable benefit and retaining it without payment would be unjust.
- In dissolution cases, routine financial support and sacrifices ordinarily incident to marriage are not reimbursed as restitution; restitution is reserved for unusual cases involving extraordinary contributions directed to a specific objective that primarily benefits the other spouse.
- A professional degree and the earning capacity associated with it are not treated as divisible marital property; restitution instead focuses on reimbursing the supporting spouse for the value of benefits conferred.
- The restitution measure is based on the supporting spouse’s contributions (and any appropriate deductions for benefits the supporting spouse received), rather than expectation damages based on the unenforceable promise.

## Conclusion

*Pyeatte v. Pyeatte* rejected contract enforcement of an oral spousal plan to trade educational support because the understanding lacked sufficiently definite terms, but it recognized that restitution may be available in dissolution to repay a spouse who made extraordinary contributions to fund the other spouse’s professional education when the marriage ends soon after the benefit is realized; the case was sent back for a restitution-based determination rather than contract damages.


Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (1982)