## Facts

- Jamar Alonzo Quarles pleaded guilty in federal district court to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- The government sought a higher sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum when the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” (including “burglary”) or a serious drug offense.
- One ACCA predicate the district court relied on was Quarles’s 2002 Michigan conviction for third-degree home invasion under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(4).
- Michigan’s third-degree home-invasion statute applied when a person breaks and enters a dwelling (or enters without permission) and, at any time while entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a misdemeanor.
- Quarles argued that this Michigan offense was broader than “generic burglary” under ACCA because it allowed liability even if the defendant’s intent to commit a crime was formed only after the unlawful entry or after the unlawful remaining began.
- The district court rejected Quarles’s argument and sentenced him under ACCA.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide when the intent to commit a crime must exist for ACCA “remaining-in” burglary.

## Issues

1. For ACCA’s generic “remaining-in” burglary, must a defendant have the intent to commit a crime at the exact moment he or she first unlawfully remains in a building or structure?
2. Or does generic “remaining-in” burglary also cover cases where the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in the building or structure?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit.
- In a unanimous opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that generic “remaining-in” burglary under ACCA occurs when a defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building or structure.
- Because Michigan’s third-degree home-invasion statute fits within that definition, it qualifies as “burglary” under ACCA.
- Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.

## Legal Principles

- ACCA’s listed offense of “burglary” refers to “generic burglary,” defined in Taylor v. United States as unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.
- “Remaining in” describes a continuing course of unlawful presence, not a single instant; therefore, the intent element is satisfied if the intent to commit a crime is formed at any point during that unlawful presence.
- The requirement that intent be contemporaneous with the unlawful “remaining in” is met so long as the intent arises while the defendant is still unlawfully in the building or structure.
- In defining generic burglary for ACCA, the Court looks to ordinary meaning, how state burglary laws commonly operated when Congress enacted ACCA’s burglary language, and Congress’s reason for treating burglary as a violent-felony predicate (the risk of confrontation during an unlawful intrusion).
- Under the categorical approach, a state conviction counts as ACCA burglary if its elements substantially correspond to, or are narrower than, the elements of generic burglary.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that ACCA generic “remaining-in” burglary includes situations where the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a building or structure, and it therefore affirmed that Michigan third-degree home invasion qualifies as “burglary” under ACCA.


Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019)