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R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006]...

ResourcesR (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006]...

Facts

  • The appellants were subjected to stop and search by police officers under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
  • Section 44 permits stop and search without specific suspicion within designated areas.
  • The relevant legal framework also involved the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which requires "reasonable suspicion" based on factual evidence for stop and search.
  • The case challenged whether the powers given to officers, particularly under section 44, were consistent with legal safeguards and human rights protections.
  • The House of Lords considered the balance between effective policing and the protection of individual freedoms under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Issues

  1. Whether stop-and-search powers exercised under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which allow for searches without specific suspicion, breached Article 8 of the ECHR.
  2. What constitutes "reasonable suspicion" under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for stop and search.
  3. Whether police officers must have factual evidence, rather than assumptions or personal views, to justify suspicion.

Decision

  • The House of Lords held that section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 granted officers excessive discretion, leading to unjustified and invasive searches.
  • It was decided that the use of section 44 powers violated Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects the right to privacy.
  • The House of Lords clarified that "reasonable suspicion" under section 1 of PACE must be based on factual evidence known to the officer at the time, not merely on general possibilities or subjective beliefs.
  • The decision guided police practice by requiring specific, factual details to justify stop and search actions.
  • "Reasonable suspicion" demands factual evidence available to the officer at the time of the stop, exceeding a general possibility but not necessitating certainty.
  • Police powers to stop and search must be exercised within lawful constraints and in accordance with human rights standards, particularly Article 8 ECHR.
  • The judgment highlights the need for accountability by mandating officers to document the specific grounds for their suspicion.
  • An officer's personal view cannot by itself justify a stop and search; objective justification is required.
  • Anti-terrorism measures must comply with human rights obligations.

Conclusion

The House of Lords in R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis established that stop-and-search powers must be supported by factual evidence and subject to ECHR safeguards, limiting arbitrary police discretion and emphasizing the need for accountability and respect for privacy rights.

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