## Facts

- The case concerned a challenge to the legality of section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which makes it a criminal offence to assist or encourage another person’s suicide.
- Claimants, unable to end their lives without assistance due to irreversible physical disabilities, argued that the absolute ban infringed their right to autonomy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
- Article 8 protects the right to respect for private and family life, central to the claimants’ argument in seeking lawful assisted dying.
- The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), specifically sections 3 and 4, required the court to consider whether the statute could be interpreted compatibly or whether a declaration of incompatibility was warranted.
- The Supreme Court ultimately acknowledged Article 8 was engaged but declined to make a declaration of incompatibility, emphasizing Parliament’s role in such matters.

## Issues

1. Whether the absolute prohibition of assisted suicide in section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 is compatible with Article 8 ECHR.
2. Whether the interference with Article 8 rights is justified under Article 8(2) by the need to protect vulnerable individuals.
3. Whether the court should interpret section 2(1) compatibly under section 3 HRA, issue a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA, or defer to Parliament on this matter.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court found that section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 engaged Article 8 ECHR as it interfered with personal autonomy regarding end-of-life decisions.
- The Court accepted that the prohibition aimed to protect vulnerable people and social interests, constituting a potentially justified interference under Article 8(2).
- A majority declined to issue a declaration of incompatibility, holding that Parliament was better placed to assess the competing moral, ethical, and social policy considerations.
- The Court acknowledged previous debates by Parliament and the highly contentious nature of assisted suicide.
- Dissenting judges, including Lady Hale and Lord Kerr, considered the blanket ban a disproportionate interference and would have found incompatibility with Article 8.

## Legal Principles

- Article 8 ECHR encompasses the right to autonomy over end-of-life decisions, but its exercise may be lawfully restricted in pursuit of legitimate aims.
- The margin of appreciation doctrine allows substantial discretion to national authorities on matters of high moral and ethical sensitivity.
- Section 3 HRA requires interpretations of legislation compatible with Convention rights where possible; section 4 HRA empowers courts to declare incompatibility where not possible, but does not require it.
- The court must balance the protection of individual rights with respect for parliamentary sovereignty and the legislative process.
- Previous authority, including R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800, was reaffirmed regarding the judicial deference on complex socio-ethical issues.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that, although the bar on assisted suicide under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 engaged Article 8 ECHR rights, it was Parliament’s responsibility—not the judiciary’s—to determine whether reform was appropriate. The majority declined to issue a declaration of incompatibility, reasoning that the ethical and social dimensions of the issue made it more suitable for parliamentary deliberation. However, dissenting judges found the law incompatible with Article 8 due to its disproportionate effect on autonomous individuals, reflecting ongoing debate over judicial intervention in human rights issues.

R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38