## Facts

- Four Zimbabwean nationals entered the United Kingdom lawfully (2001–2008) and later sought asylum.
- Their claims arose from post-2008 election violence in Zimbabwe, where ZANU-PF–linked militias allegedly used roadblocks and interrogations to identify perceived opponents or insufficiently loyal persons.
- Some claimants were apolitical or had no political beliefs; they alleged persecution risk based on imputed political opinion or inability to show affirmative ZANU-PF support (e.g., party card, slogans, songs).
- The Secretary of State refused asylum, reasoning the claimants lacked a sufficient political profile and could avoid harm by explaining neutrality, relocating, or lying/feigning loyalty if questioned.
- The immigration tribunal dismissed the appeals, relying in part on country guidance describing violence against perceived disloyalty while stressing individualized credibility and risk assessment.
- The Court of Appeal rejected the “expected to lie” approach; the Secretary of State appealed in RT and a claimant appealed in KM.
- The UK Supreme Court heard the joined appeals and issued a single unanimous judgment (Lord Dyson).

## Issues

1. Whether a refugee claim can be refused on the ground that an apolitical claimant could avoid persecution by lying or feigning political loyalty to the persecutory regime.
2. Whether the Refugee Convention’s “political opinion” ground protects neutrality or the absence of political belief, including where risk arises from imputed political opinion.
3. Whether the principle that a person cannot be required to conceal a protected characteristic to avoid persecution applies to political opinion in the same way it applies to other Convention grounds.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeals and allowed the claimants’ appeals.
- It held that it is not a lawful answer to deny asylum on the theory that the claimant can avoid persecution by lying, feigning loyalty, or concealing the absence of political belief.
- It held that the Convention protects political neutrality and the absence of political opinion, including where persecution risk is based on imputed political opinion.
- It affirmed that tribunals must still decide credibility and whether the claimant faces a real risk on return, but may not treat willingness to lie as a permissible means of risk avoidance.

## Legal Principles

- Refugee protection is not defeated by asserting the claimant could escape persecution by deception about a Convention ground (including political opinion).
- “Political opinion” includes the right not to hold, not to express, and not to feign political beliefs; neutrality and indifference can fall within the protected ground where persecution is linked to that (actual or imputed) stance.
- There is no hierarchy among Convention grounds; each protects characteristics or statuses a person cannot change or cannot be expected to change because they are tied to identity or fundamental rights.
- Imputed political opinion satisfies the Convention nexus when persecutors attribute disloyalty or opposition to a claimant and target the claimant on that basis.
- Fact-finders must assess individualized risk on the evidence and country conditions, but cannot reduce risk by assuming the claimant will suppress or falsify a protected belief (or non-belief).

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that asylum cannot be refused on the basis that an apolitical person could avoid persecution by pretending loyalty to an authoritarian regime; the Refugee Convention protects political neutrality and non-belief, including risks arising from imputed political opinion, subject to ordinary findings on credibility and real risk on return.


R (RT (Zimbabwe)) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2012] UKSC 38 (U.K. 2012)