## Facts

- The case concerned how UK courts should approach European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law when interpreting Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.
- The main legal question was the effect of Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires UK courts to "take into account" ECtHR judgments.
- Arguments addressed the degree of alignment required between domestic courts and Strasbourg interpretations in the context of applying the ECHR.

## Issues

1. Whether UK courts must follow ECtHR case law when interpreting rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. How Section 2 of the Human Rights Act should be understood regarding the obligation to "take into account" ECtHR judgments.
3. Whether there are circumstances in which UK courts may lawfully diverge from Strasbourg jurisprudence.
4. What role the margin of appreciation and national discretion play when applying Convention rights in the domestic context.

## Decision

- The House of Lords held that UK courts should generally align with the ECtHR’s interpretation of Convention rights, a position termed the "mirror principle."
- It was clarified that "take into account" in Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 established a strong presumption that UK courts would follow Strasbourg case law, though not an absolute requirement.
- The judgment recognized limited exceptions, allowing domestic courts to diverge from ECtHR decisions if those were unclear, outdated, or manifestly wrong, provided strong justification was given.
- The decision affirmed the continuing relevance of national discretion within the framework of ECHR rights, as long as core Convention standards are maintained.
- The House of Lords acknowledged the potential for UK courts to contribute to the evolution of human rights law, but emphasized such developments should be approached cautiously and collaboratively.

## Legal Principles

- The "mirror principle" guides UK courts to generally apply ECtHR jurisprudence when interpreting Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.
- Section 2 imposes a duty to consider, but not invariably to follow, Strasbourg case law; alignment should be the norm with limited, reasoned departures permitted.
- The margin of appreciation acknowledges national discretion in enforcing Convention rights, but such discretion must not undermine the rights' core.
- Domestic courts have a contributory, but restrained, role in the development of human rights law alongside the ECtHR.

## Conclusion

The decision in R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator established the mirror principle, effectively requiring UK courts to follow ECtHR interpretations of Convention rights except in specific, well-justified cases. It clarified the application of Section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 and the relationship between domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence, while affirming both the necessity of consistency and the limited scope for justified divergence in UK human rights adjudication.

R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 [2004] 2 AC 323