Facts
- Abdul-Hussain and other appellants hijacked an aircraft to escape persecution in Iraq.
- They feared being returned to Iraq, where they believed they faced torture or execution.
- The appellants claimed that these fears compelled them to commit the hijacking under duress.
Issues
- Whether the requirement of immediacy in the threat for the defence of duress was met in the circumstances of the case.
- Whether the subjective perception of threat by the defendants should be considered when assessing duress.
- Whether the threat must be virtually instantaneous or can be of future harm if operative on the defendant's mind.
Decision
- The Court of Appeal held that the immediacy requirement for duress does not necessitate that the threat be strictly instantaneous.
- It was determined that a threat of future harm could constitute duress if it was actively influencing the defendant at the time of the offence.
- The critical consideration is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to escape the threat without committing the crime.
- The court emphasized a subjective assessment of the threat as experienced by the defendant.
Legal Principles
- The threatened harm for duress must be “operative on the defendant’s mind” at the time of the offence, reflecting a subjective approach.
- A strict requirement that the threat be immediate in the sense of “about to happen” was relaxed; the threat must instead be present and active in the defendant’s mind.
- The defence of duress also requires that a person of reasonable firmness, sharing the defendant’s characteristics, would have acted in the same way.
- Subsequent case law, such as R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, has refined and partially restricted the application of this principle, emphasizing both the imminence of the threat and whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to escape.
Conclusion
R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 established that the requirement for immediacy in threats supporting a defence of duress means the threat must be actively operative on the defendant at the relevant time, not necessarily immediate in the strictest temporal sense. This case marked a significant shift from a rigid to a more flexible, subjective evaluation of threats in duress, subject to later refinements in case law.