## Facts

- Becerra and Cooper agreed to commit a burglary and set out together to execute that plan, entering the victim’s house unlawfully with intent to steal.
- Once inside, they unexpectedly encountered the householder.
- At that moment Becerra shouted words of alarm—commonly rendered in reports as “Let’s go!”—and immediately escaped through a window.
- Cooper, however, remained in the premises; he proceeded to seize property and, in the course of doing so, used violence against the occupant.
- When arrested and tried, Becerra contended that his shouted warning coupled with his flight amounted to a complete withdrawal from the joint enterprise before the assault and final appropriation were completed.

## Issues

1. Whether Becerra’s shouted warning and physical departure amounted to an effective, legally recognised withdrawal from the joint enterprise so as to relieve him of liability for the acts that followed.
2. What objective criteria English criminal law applies when determining whether withdrawal by a secondary party has occurred in time and with sufficient clarity.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal dismissed Becerra’s appeal and affirmed his conviction for burglary with violence.
- The court held that a person who has encouraged or assisted the commission of an offence remains liable unless he or she takes steps which are:
  - (a) clear and unequivocal, so that other participants know assistance has been terminated; and
  - (b) timely, so that they still have a realistic opportunity to desist from or at least modify the planned crime.
- On the facts, Becerra’s warning did not satisfy either requirement. His words were ambiguous—equally capable of meaning “watch out” rather than “I am out”—and were uttered after entry had been forced and confrontation had begun. Cooper therefore had no genuine chance to stand down.
- Mere flight from the scene, without explanatory words or acts directed to the accomplice, was likewise inadequate. The court emphasised that withdrawal demands a “positive and demonstrated countermand” of prior encouragement.

## Legal Principles

- Accessorial liability derives from assistance or encouragement rendered before or during the offence; liability will persist unless that assistance is effectively neutralised.
- Effective withdrawal requires more than a mental change of heart. The defendant must communicate dissent in a way that objectively cancels the earlier encouragement.
- Communication must reach the accomplice, be comprehensible, and allow practical time for reflection or retreat. A late or obscure message fails this test.
- The principle is illustrated in earlier authorities such as R v Whitefield (noting the need for unequivocal action) and R v Rook (where failure to attend a contract killing did not amount to withdrawal because no message was passed to the principal). Those decisions, together with the present case, form a consistent line stressing that passivity or silence does not suffice.
- In applying the rule, courts examine:
  - Nature of the original assistance (e.g., physical presence, provision of weapons, prior agreement).
  - Definiteness of the repudiation (verbal or physical acts directed at accomplices).
  - Temporal proximity—withdrawal must precede the essential acts of the offence or at least leave time for prevention.
- Where violence is foreseeable, an accomplice who simply absents himself after events have escalated continues to bear responsibility for ensuing harm, as the risk was part of the contemplated enterprise.

## Conclusion

R v Becerra and Cooper confirms that an accessory cannot erase liability merely by losing nerve at the critical moment. Withdrawal must be a decisive, communicated renunciation delivered early enough for remaining participants to abandon or alter their conduct. Because Becerra’s alarm was both ambiguous and late, he remained accountable for the burglary and attendant assault committed by Cooper.


R v Becerra and Cooper (1976) 62 Cr App R 212