## Facts

- Imre Finta was a Hungarian gendarmerie officer and commander in Szeged, Hungary during World War II.
- The Crown alleged that in 1944 he took part in rounding up Jewish civilians from the Szeged ghetto, detaining them, taking their property, and deporting them to Nazi-controlled camps.
- Finta immigrated to Canada after the war and became a Canadian citizen in 1956.
- In 1988, Canadian authorities charged him under Criminal Code provisions dealing with war crimes and crimes against humanity, using underlying Criminal Code offences (including unlawful confinement, robbery, kidnapping, and manslaughter) framed as war crimes/crimes against humanity.
- At trial before a jury in Ontario, Finta raised Charter objections (including delay) and relied on a “peace officer / lawful authority” theory connected to Criminal Code ss. 15 and 25.
- The jury acquitted Finta on all counts.
- The Crown appealed, arguing that trial rulings and the jury charge contained errors (including on mens rea, identification, evidentiary matters such as hearsay, and the handling of improper comments by defence counsel).
- The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.
- The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where several public-interest groups intervened.

## Issues

1. Does Charter s. 11(b) (trial within a reasonable time) apply to the decades-long period between the alleged 1944 conduct and the laying of charges in 1988, or only to delay after a person is “charged”?
2. Do the Criminal Code war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity provisions, as applied to WWII-era conduct abroad, breach Charter protections against retroactive punishment and unfairness (including ss. 7, 11(a), 11(d), 11(g), 12, and 15)?
3. Do the provisions create new stand-alone offences, or do they primarily authorize Canadian jurisdiction and liability for ordinary Criminal Code offences committed abroad when the required war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity elements are also proven?
4. What mens rea must the Crown prove for war crimes/crimes against humanity based on underlying offences: is intent for the underlying offence enough, or must the accused also know the broader circumstances that make the act a war crime or crime against humanity?
5. In a prosecution of this kind, what is the scope of Criminal Code ss. 15 and 25 (peace officer / acting under authority), including the treatment of manifestly unlawful orders?
6. Did alleged errors in evidence rulings, jury instructions, or trial management justify setting aside the acquittals and ordering a new trial?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown’s appeal and left the acquittals in place.
- On Charter s. 11(b), the majority held the “unreasonable delay” period is measured from the laying of charges; the long pre-charge passage of time did not itself establish a s. 11(b) breach.
- The majority rejected additional Charter challenges (including ss. 7, 11(a), 11(d), 11(g), 12, and 15), and upheld the constitutionality of the relevant Criminal Code war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity regime as interpreted.
- The Court required strict proof for conviction, including proof of the underlying offence elements and the extra war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity elements (with a demanding mental element).
- The Court found no reversible trial error warranting interference with the jury’s verdict, including with respect to the handling of evidence and the trial judge’s instructions intended to address improper remarks by defence counsel.
- There were concurring and dissenting reasons, but the majority disposition controlled: appeal dismissed, acquittals affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- Charter s. 11(b) protects against unreasonable delay after a person becomes “charged”; it does not convert long pre-charge investigative delay, by itself, into a s. 11(b) breach.
- Parliament may authorize Canadian prosecution of WWII-era conduct committed abroad through war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity provisions without offending Charter ss. 7 or 11(g), where the regime is tied to conduct that was criminal under applicable law and recognized as war crimes/crimes against humanity when committed.
- For war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity prosecutions built on underlying Criminal Code offences, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
  - the actus reus and mens rea of the underlying offence(s); and
  - the additional elements that make the conduct a war crime or a crime against humanity, including the accused’s knowledge of the relevant circumstances giving the conduct that character.
- Defences based on authority of office or orders (including Criminal Code ss. 15 and 25) may be put to the jury where supported by the record, but cannot justify conduct that is plainly illegal; the legality of the order and the accused’s reasonable belief in lawful authority are central.
- Appellate courts show strong restraint before setting aside jury acquittals; even where imperfections exist in a charge or trial management, a new trial is not ordered unless legal error capable of affecting the verdict is shown.

## Conclusion

In *R. v. Finta*, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Criminal Code’s war-crimes and crimes-against-humanity provisions as applied to WWII-era conduct, held that Charter s. 11(b) measures delay from the laying of charges rather than from the historical events, required stringent proof (including a demanding mental element tied to the war-crimes/crimes-against-humanity context), and dismissed the Crown’s appeal, leaving the jury’s acquittals intact.


R. v. Finta, 28 C.R. (4th) 265 (1994)