Facts
- The case involved the defendant, Gilmour, who supplied fuel to the main offender, knowing it would be used to start a fire.
- The main offender committed arson, and the resulting fire caused a death.
- Gilmour claimed he did not intend or foresee the fatal outcome.
- He was initially convicted of manslaughter as a secondary party to arson.
- The Court of Appeal reconsidered his liability based on what he realistically anticipated would occur.
Issues
- Whether a secondary party can be held liable for outcomes of the principal offense that were not specifically intended but could have been anticipated.
- To what extent foreseeability, rather than intent, should limit secondary party liability in group crimes.
- Whether the evidence supported Gilmour's liability for manslaughter given his knowledge and expectations.
Decision
- The Court of Appeal held that Gilmour could only be liable for offenses he anticipated might occur, not for all consequences resulting from the principal's acts.
- It was determined that Gilmour foresaw and anticipated arson but did not anticipate death or serious injury.
- Gilmour's conviction for manslaughter was overturned since he did not realistically anticipate the fatal outcome.
Legal Principles
- Secondary party liability is limited to offenses the party realistically anticipated as possible, not all outcomes of the principal's conduct.
- The test for secondary liability requires evaluation of the secondary party’s actual knowledge, foresight, and intentions at the time of the offense.
- Evidence such as prior plans, communications, and the context of the offense are key to assessing anticipatory knowledge.
- This approach differs from older joint enterprise principles which held secondary parties liable for all outcomes, even unexpected ones.
- The foreseeability rule was later affirmed and refined by R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, which replaced the “foresight of possibility” test with a more precise standard.
Conclusion
R v Gilmour established that secondary liability in group crimes should be confined to outcomes the secondary party realistically anticipated, promoting a fairer allocation of responsibility according to actual knowledge and expectations rather than unforeseen consequences.