R v Gilmour [2000] 2 Cr App R 407

Facts

• The case involved the defendant, Gilmour, who supplied fuel to the main offender, knowing it would be used to start a fire.
• The main offender committed arson, and the resulting fire caused a death.
• Gilmour claimed he did not intend or foresee the fatal outcome.
• He was initially convicted of manslaughter as a secondary party to arson.
• The Court of Appeal reconsidered his liability based on what he realistically anticipated would occur.

Issues

1. Whether a secondary party can be held liable for outcomes of the principal offense that were not specifically intended but could have been anticipated.
2. To what extent foreseeability, rather than intent, should limit secondary party liability in group crimes.
3. Whether the evidence supported Gilmour's liability for manslaughter given his knowledge and expectations.

Decision

• The Court of Appeal held that Gilmour could only be liable for offenses he anticipated might occur, not for all consequences resulting from the principal's acts.
• It was determined that Gilmour foresaw and anticipated arson but did not anticipate death or serious injury.
• Gilmour's conviction for manslaughter was overturned since he did not realistically anticipate the fatal outcome.

Legal Principles

• Secondary party liability is limited to offenses the party realistically anticipated as possible, not all outcomes of the principal's conduct.
• The test for secondary liability requires evaluation of the secondary party’s actual knowledge, foresight, and intentions at the time of the offense.
• Evidence such as prior plans, communications, and the context of the offense are key to assessing anticipatory knowledge.
• This approach differs from older joint enterprise principles which held secondary parties liable for all outcomes, even unexpected ones.
• The foreseeability rule was later affirmed and refined by R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, which replaced the “foresight of possibility” test with a more precise standard.

Conclusion

R v Gilmour established that secondary liability in group crimes should be confined to outcomes the secondary party realistically anticipated, promoting a fairer allocation of responsibility according to actual knowledge and expectations rather than unforeseen consequences.