Facts
- Mr. Gullefer attended a greyhound stadium and lawfully placed a £18 bet on a particular dog to win.
- As the race progressed, he concluded his chosen dog was unlikely to finish first and that his stake would be lost.
- In response, he jumped onto the track, waving his arms so as to distract the greyhounds and force a steward to declare a “no-race.”
- By voiding the race, betting rules required bookmakers to return all stakes, which would enable him to recover his money despite the dog’s poor performance.
- Security staff quickly removed him from the track, and the race was ultimately restarted. He was arrested on suspicion of attempted theft of the stake he hoped to reclaim.
- No bookmakers had yet been approached, and no demand for repayment had been made when he was detained.
Issues
- Whether the disruptive act on the track constituted an “act more than merely preparatory” to the offence of theft under section 1(1) Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
- How courts should identify the boundary between mere preparation and commencement of the substantive offence where the defendant’s plan involves several discrete stages.
Decision
- The Court of Appeal (Lord Lane CJ, Lloyd and Farquharson LJJ) quashed the conviction for attempted theft.
- Their Lordships reasoned that the crime of theft would not begin until the defendant attempted to recover the stake from the bookmaker; jumping onto the course was an antecedent step that merely set the scene.
- They articulated that an act becomes an attempt only when the defendant has done “an act which shows that he has actually gone on to try to commit the offence itself, i.e. he has started the commission of the crime proper.”
- Because the defendant had not yet approached the bookmaker or exercised any proprietary right over the money, he remained within the preparatory phase and could be charged, at most, with an offence such as public nuisance or breach of the peace, but not attempted theft.
Legal Principles
- Section 1(1) Criminal Attempts Act 1981 requires that the defendant do an act “more than merely preparatory” toward the commission of the intended offence. R v Gullefer provides authoritative guidance on the statutory phrase.
- The Court introduced the “starting the crime itself” test: the decisive moment is when conduct shifts from arranging circumstances to actually executing the elements of the target offence. The focus is practical and fact-sensitive.
- The judgment emphasised that preparatory conduct may be quite extensive—planning, arming oneself, travelling to the scene, or, as here, creating conditions believed necessary for success—yet still fall short of an attempt.
- Later authorities, notably R v Geddes (where a man found hiding in a school toilet with rope and tape had not begun kidnapping) and R v Campbell (where a would-be robber outside a post office had not entered the premises), relied on Gullefer to reaffirm that an attempt requires proximity to the completed crime, not merely proximity in place or time.
- The mental element (intent) was undisputed; the case turned solely on actus reus. Thus, even clear intent does not cure insufficiency of act when assessing liability for attempts.
Conclusion
R v Gullefer confirms that criminal liability for attempt arises only when the defendant’s conduct has moved from preparation to direct implementation of the offence. By framing the inquiry around whether the defendant has “started the crime itself,” the decision supplies a workable, fact-driven benchmark that continues to guide English courts in distinguishing preliminary manoeuvres from punishable attempts.
