Introduction
The case of R v Hancock and Shankland [1986] 2 WLR 257 represents a significant judgment by the House of Lords concerning the legal concept of intention within the context of criminal law, specifically murder. The case addresses the complex relationship between foresight of consequences and the establishment of intention. This case considers the requirements for finding a defendant liable for murder, highlighting the necessity for the prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant intended either to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. The House of Lords, in reaching its decision, aimed to clarify earlier guidance concerning intention that had been deemed unsatisfactory. The judgment emphasizes that foresight of consequences is not intention itself, but instead it is to be treated as evidence that a jury may consider when determining if intent existed.
The Facts of R v Hancock and Shankland
The case involved two defendants, Hancock and Shankland, who were striking miners. During the industrial action, they threw a concrete block from a bridge onto a motorway below. This action resulted in the death of a taxi driver when the block struck his vehicle. The defendants argued that their intention was solely to obstruct the roadway, rather than to kill or cause serious injury to anyone. The trial judge, however, based his direction to the jury on the precedent set in R v Moloney, which focused on whether the consequence (death or grievous bodily harm) was a natural consequence of the defendants’ act, and whether they foresaw that consequence as natural. Based on this direction, the defendants were convicted of murder.
The House of Lords Decision
On appeal, the House of Lords reviewed the conviction, with Lord Scarman expressing reservations regarding the application of the Moloney guidelines. The judgment of the House of Lords substituted the murder verdict for a manslaughter verdict. The ruling emphasized that the prosecution must prove the defendant had the intention either to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. Lord Scarman argued that the Moloney directions regarding the link between foresight and intention were problematic, and risked misleading a jury. The House of Lords clarified that intention should not be equated with foresight of consequences. Instead, they established that foresight can act as evidence towards establishing intent. The judgment detailed that the greater the probability of a consequence, the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen, and, if foreseen, the more probable it was intended. It is, therefore, critical to understand that this case does not treat foresight as an alternative to intention, but rather as a critical component of evidence.
Re-evaluating Moloney and the Importance of Foresight
The decision in R v Hancock and Shankland significantly adjusted the approach taken in the earlier case of R v Moloney. Moloney had proposed that if a defendant foresaw death or grievous bodily harm as the natural consequence of their actions, a jury could infer an intention to cause that harm. The judgment in Hancock and Shankland altered this interpretation, clarifying that although foresight is relevant, it should not be considered as the same as intention. It established that foresight serves only as circumstantial evidence from which intention may or may not be inferred. This distinction is essential; it prevents the misinterpretation that simply anticipating a result equates to desiring it. The ruling emphasized that the focus of the jury must remain on the actual intent of the accused, using foresight of the results as one of the aspects to determine this intent, rather than as a substitute for intention itself.
Impact on the Definition of Intention
The case of R v Hancock and Shankland directly addresses the concept of “oblique intention,” which is when a defendant's primary purpose is not to cause the resulting harm but they acknowledge that their actions could lead to such a result. This legal principle is crucial, as it addresses situations where an outcome, though not the desired one, was a foreseeable or highly probable consequence of actions. The ruling provided a more precise tool for the courts and juries to analyse indirect intention, making it more challenging for a defendant to be found guilty of murder simply on the basis of their ability to foresee a consequence of their action. The House of Lords ruled that establishing intention requires looking not only at the foresight of the consequence, but also evaluating the probability of the consequence in order to determine if intention is met.
Further Clarification by Nedrick and Woollin
Following Hancock and Shankland, subsequent case law refined the parameters of intention, most notably in R v Nedrick (1986) and R v Woollin (1998). The Nedrick case introduced the concept of "virtual certainty," proposing that a jury could infer intention if they were satisfied that the defendant recognized that death or serious harm would be a virtually certain outcome of their actions. Woollin further cemented the virtual certainty test, stipulating that it is the correct test to apply when looking at oblique intention. These cases built on Hancock and Shankland's framework, affirming that whilst foresight is a factor in establishing intent, it remains separate from intention itself. The legal system must also look at the subjective state of the defendant during the action, not simply whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the result. This has become the leading principle in establishing indirect intention for murder.
Conclusion
R v Hancock and Shankland stands as a critical judgment in the evolution of the law regarding intention in criminal liability. By rejecting the suggestion that foresight is equal to intention, the ruling reinforced the fundamental requirement of establishing the defendant’s actual mental state at the time of the act. The decision shifted away from a more mechanical assessment based solely on the naturalness of a consequence, toward an analysis of probability. The ruling by Lord Scarman established that the greater the probability of the consequence, the easier it is to infer intention from the foresight. This principle was subsequently refined by R v Nedrick and R v Woollin, both of which further developed the concept of oblique intent. The case remains important for its clarification of the relationship between foresight and intention, guiding juries and courts in assessing the mens rea for murder and other serious offenses and preventing the misapplication of the concept of foresight as the actual intent.