R v Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978

Facts

• Johnson was charged under section 5(1) of the Theft Act 1978 for obtaining services without honest payment by staying in a hotel without settling the bill.
• He claimed he believed he was entitled to remain in the hotel due to a separate arrangement.
• The Court of Appeal examined whether Johnson’s belief—though possibly mistaken—impacted the assessment of dishonesty within the offence.

Issues

1. Whether "wrong" in section 2(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1978, when assessing dishonesty, should be interpreted according to legal rules or moral standards.
2. Whether a genuine, albeit incorrect, belief in having a legal right can negate the element of dishonesty in dishonesty-based offences.

Decision

• The Court of Appeal confirmed that "wrong" in the context of dishonesty offences refers to conduct that breaks the law, not merely that which violates moral norms.
• A defendant’s sincere belief in having a legal right, even if incorrect as a matter of law, may remove the element of dishonesty.
• Personal moral views are not determinative of criminal responsibility; the law’s objective standards govern.
• The prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant acted dishonestly according to legal criteria.

Legal Principles

• The assessment of dishonesty in criminal law is governed by legal standards rather than subjective moral opinions.
• A defendant’s genuine belief that they have a legal right can, if honest, serve as a defence to dishonesty-based crimes, provided it is rooted in legality and not mere morality.
• Johnson confirms previous authority such as R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, reinforcing the law-focused standard in interpreting "wrong."
• The principle of mens rea requires that both the actus reus and a culpable mental state be established to secure a conviction.

Conclusion

R v Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978 held that, for dishonesty offences, "wrong" must be understood as contravening legal rules rather than simply acting immorally, and that a genuine, even if mistaken, belief in a legal right may negate dishonesty for the purposes of mens rea in criminal law.