## Facts

- Kimsey (K) was involved in a high-speed chase with another driver, Osbourne (O), prior to a fatal incident.
- Expert evidence showed that O’s vehicle clipped a verge, spun out of control, collided with K’s car, and subsequently entered oncoming traffic resulting in O’s death.
- The prosecution asserted that K’s dangerous driving—either attempting to overtake or driving too closely—contributed to O’s death.
- The defense argued O’s unexpected swerve was the main cause, potentially severing any chain of causation between K’s actions and the fatality.
- The court examined factual and legal causation, considering whether K’s actions materially contributed to the sequence of events leading to O’s death.

## Issues

1. Whether K’s dangerous driving needed to be the substantial cause of death or merely a contributing cause for criminal liability.
2. Whether the chain of causation was broken by O’s own driving, absolving K of legal responsibility.
3. Whether the trial judge’s direction to the jury regarding the standard of causation was correct in law.
4. Whether the sentence imposed on K was reasonable in the circumstances.

## Decision

- The court upheld K’s conviction and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
- It determined that K’s dangerous driving did not have to be the substantial cause of death, but simply a cause.
- The jury was correctly directed that it was enough for K’s driving to be a material contributing factor.
- The court rejected arguments that O’s swerve broke the chain of causation, finding K’s conduct put O in a dangerous position leading to the fatal outcome.
- The sentence of two years’ imprisonment and a four-year driving ban was deemed reasonable, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.

## Legal Principles

- In dangerous driving cases resulting in death, the defendant’s conduct must be shown to have been a cause, not necessarily the sole or substantial cause, of the fatality.
- The precedent from R v Hennigan [1971] 2 QB 73 was affirmed: liability attaches if the defendant’s conduct is more than a minimal cause of the result.
- A chain of causation is not normally broken where the conduct of the deceased is a foreseeable reaction to the defendant’s dangerous driving.
- The prosecution need not prove the defendant’s actions were the principal cause; a material causal connection suffices to establish guilt.

## Conclusion

R v Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 established that for a dangerous driving conviction resulting in death, the prosecution need only demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was a cause of the fatal outcome, not necessarily the substantial or sole cause. This less onerous standard broadens liability in such cases and clarifies that multiple contributing factors do not preclude conviction if the defendant’s driving materially contributed to the death.
