## Facts

- The defendant, Linekar, entered into an agreement for sexual services with the complainant, who was a sex worker, with payment as a central term of the arrangement.
- After the sexual act took place, Linekar intentionally refused to pay the complainant as previously agreed.
- The complainant’s consent to the sexual act was contingent on receiving payment.
- The prosecution argued that Linekar’s refusal to pay constituted dishonesty relevant to the act, potentially negating consent.
- The case was considered by the Court of Appeal, which examined whether dishonesty about payment invalidated consent for the sexual act in this context.

## Issues

1. Whether the defendant’s failure to pay after an explicit agreement constituted dishonesty that invalidated the complainant’s consent to the sexual act.
2. Whether deceptions regarding payment are fundamentally different from other types of deception, such as those about marital status, finances, or personal identity, in the context of sexual offence law.
3. Whether dishonesty about terms directly related to the act, rather than unrelated matters, negates consent under the law.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal held that in paid sexual arrangements, payment is a central term upon which consent is based.
- The court found that Linekar’s refusal to pay after receiving the service was dishonesty directly tied to the agreed conditions, thereby negating consent.
- The court distinguished this situation from cases where deception concerned unrelated matters, finding that only dishonesty about terms central to the act can invalidate consent.
- The ruling clarified that where the consent to sexual activity is conditional on payment, dishonesty about payment nullifies that consent.

## Legal Principles

- Consent in sexual offence law must be a product of free agreement, untainted by coercion or deception.
- Dishonesty that undermines the core terms of a sexual agreement—such as payment in the context of commercial sex—negates consent.
- Deception about matters unrelated to the nature or fundamental terms of the act generally does not invalidate consent.
- The case differentiates between dishonesty affecting the agreed conditions of a sexual act, which negates consent, and dishonesty about unrelated matters, which does not.

## Conclusion

R v Linekar established that dishonesty concerning central terms—specifically, payment in a commercial sexual arrangement—negates consent, setting a precedent distinguishing between deceptions directly affecting consent and those related to unrelated issues. This decision clarified legal standards for assessing consent and dishonesty in paid sexual agreements, influencing subsequent case law and the protection of sex workers' rights.


R v Linekar [1995] 3 All ER 69