Facts
- Martin was charged with driving while unlicensed.
- His defence was that he drove because his wife threatened to commit suicide if he did not take his stepson to work promptly, fearing the stepson would lose his job otherwise.
- Martin believed his wife would act upon her threat.
- The trial judge did not allow the jury to consider the defence of necessity.
- On appeal, the High Court determined the jury should have been permitted to consider necessity as a defence.
Issues
- Whether duress of circumstances (necessity) could qualify as a defence under English criminal law.
- Whether the accused’s belief in the threat needed to be both genuine (subjective) and objectively reasonable.
- Whether the jury, rather than the judge, should decide if the defence of necessity applies based on the facts as asserted by the defendant.
Decision
- The High Court allowed Martin’s appeal.
- It held that necessity, including duress of circumstances, is recognised as a defence in cases of extreme danger.
- The trial judge should have left the defence of necessity to the jury to consider.
- The case clarified that if the defendant’s assertions could allow for the defence, the jury must assess both the genuineness of the belief in the threat and whether it was objectively reasonable.
Legal Principles
- English law recognises a defence of necessity (duress of circumstances) where the accused acts reasonably and proportionately to avoid a threat of death or serious injury.
- The defence requires a dual test: a genuinely held belief by the defendant in imminent danger (subjective element), and that a sober person of reasonable firmness would have acted similarly (objective element).
- Juries, not judges, should determine whether necessity applies if the facts support its consideration.
- The standards in necessity draw parallels to those in duress by threats, self-defence, and provocation, focusing consistently on both subjective belief and objective reasonableness.
Conclusion
R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652 confirmed the defence of necessity, specifically duress of circumstances, within English law, requiring both a genuine and objectively reasonable belief in a threat, and established that the jury must determine its applicability when the evidence permits.