Facts
- The defendants, Pace and Rogers, operated a scrap metal yard.
- They were charged under section 329(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 with converting criminal property after purchasing scrap metal they believed was stolen.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that suspicion or doubt about the metal's origin was sufficient for conviction, even if the defendants did not specifically intend to deal with stolen property.
- The defendants were convicted and subsequently appealed on the basis of misdirection to the jury.
Issues
- Whether section 329(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 requires defendants to intend all parts of the offence, specifically intent regarding the criminal status of the property.
- Whether suspicion or doubt about the origins of property is sufficient to satisfy the mental element for offences requiring specific intent.
- Whether the trial judge's direction to the jury improperly lowered the threshold for conviction by conflating suspicion with intent.
Decision
- The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions.
- It held that section 329(1) requires the prosecution to prove the defendant intended to handle property known to be criminal in nature; doubt or suspicion is not sufficient.
- The court determined the trial judge's direction to the jury was incorrect, as it allowed for conviction without proof of intent regarding the property's stolen status.
- The judgment clarified that "knowingly" in the statute pertains to a specific intent relating to all elements of the offence.
Legal Principles
- Offences requiring specific intent demand that the defendant intends all statutory elements of the offence, not merely suspects or doubts them.
- For section 329(1) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the mental element (mens rea) encompasses both knowledge and intent concerning the criminal provenance of property.
- Conviction for such offences cannot be based solely on suspicion, belief, or a failure to investigate; affirmative intent regarding all elements is necessary.
- Courts must interpret criminal statutes strictly, ensuring the prosecution establishes intent for every component of the offence.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeal in R v Pace and Rogers [2014] EWCA Crim 186 clarified that, for offences requiring specific intent under section 329(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a defendant must intend all parts of the crime, and mere suspicion or doubt about the fundamental facts is insufficient for conviction. This decision supports strict statutory interpretation and reinforces essential protections within the criminal justice system concerning proof of mens rea.