## Facts

- Wei Tang operated and partly owned a Melbourne brothel, “Club 417,” and held a 70% interest in a syndicate involved in arranging Thai women’s prostitution at the brothel.
- Five Thai women were brought to Australia through arrangements involving recruiters and persons described as their “owners”; four were acquired by the syndicate, and one was later transferred to the brothel.
- Each woman was subject to a claimed debt of AUD 45,000, reduced by AUD 50 per customer; customers paid AUD 110 per transaction.
- Tang received a fixed brothel fee (AUD 43 per customer) and, for four women, 70% of the remaining amount, with associates receiving 30%; for the fifth woman, the remainder was distributed to others described as her owners.
- The women worked six days per week and, on the evidence, served very large numbers of customers to discharge the debt; they could retain earnings for a seventh day, subject to brothel fees and distributions.
- The women were not typically physically confined, but evidence included retention of passports and travel arrangements by others, unlawful visa circumstances, limited English, limited money, and fear of immigration detection.
- After debts were repaid, restrictions were lifted for some women, passports were returned, and they gained greater control over work arrangements.
- Tang was convicted at trial of five counts of intentionally possessing a slave and five counts of intentionally exercising a power of ownership over a slave under Commonwealth criminal provisions defining slavery as a condition where powers attaching to ownership are exercised, including where resulting from debt or contract.
- The intermediate appellate court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding the jury directions on the mental element were inadequate because the prosecution had to prove Tang knew or believed she exercised powers “through ownership.”

## Issues

1. Whether the slavery offence required proof that the accused knew or believed the complainants were “slaves” as a matter of legal characterisation, or only that the accused intentionally engaged in conduct amounting to possession/exercise of ownership-like powers with knowledge of the relevant facts.
2. Whether the statutory definition of “slavery” was confined to chattel slavery or extended to modern, de facto slavery including debt-bonded sexual exploitation.
3. Whether the Commonwealth slavery provisions were constitutionally valid as an exercise of federal legislative power.
4. Whether the guilty verdicts were unreasonable on the evidence.

## Decision

- The High Court allowed the prosecution’s appeal and set aside the order for a new trial, restoring Tang’s convictions (6–1).
- The Court dismissed Tang’s cross-appeal challenging constitutional validity and statutory interpretation, and rejected the claim that the verdicts were unreasonable.
- The matter was remitted for consideration of sentence only.
- In dissent, Kirby J would have required a more demanding approach to the mental element and was concerned about overextension of “slavery” in criminal liability.

## Legal Principles

- “Slavery” is a functional concept: it includes situations where any or all powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised over a person, including conditions arising from a debt or contract.
- The statute is not limited to chattel slavery; modern slavery may exist without constant physical restraint where the totality of control resembles ownership.
- For the offence of intentionally possessing a slave or exercising a power of ownership over a slave, the prosecution need not prove the accused knew the legal conclusion that the person was a “slave”; it must prove intentional conduct and knowledge of the facts that constitute the exercise of ownership-like powers.
- Indicators relevant to whether ownership-like powers are exercised may include substantial enforced debt, control over labour and earnings, retention of identity/travel documents, and practical inability to exit without serious consequences.
- The Commonwealth slavery offences were within federal legislative power, supported by implementation of international obligations concerning slavery.

## Conclusion

The High Court reinstated Tang’s slavery convictions, holding that the statutory prohibition reaches modern debt-bondage exploitation in prostitution and that liability turns on intentional exercise of ownership-like control with knowledge of the facts, not on an accused’s acceptance of the legal label “slavery.”


R. v. Tang, 237 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 2008)