Introduction
The case of R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 established crucial guidelines regarding the admissibility and evaluation of eyewitness identification evidence in criminal trials within the jurisdiction of England and Wales. This judgment addresses the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony, recognizing that even genuinely held beliefs can be mistaken, which contrasts with other forms of evidence. The Court of Appeal, in this case, provided a framework for trial judges to assist juries in assessing such evidence. A key aspect is the required direction given to juries regarding the potential fallibility of eyewitness identifications and the various factors that can influence accuracy. This direction is not merely a procedural step; it is intended to function as a substantial safeguard against wrongful convictions based solely, or largely, on visual identification. The principles articulated in R v Turnbull serve as a significant benchmark for cases involving identification, emphasizing the need for careful judicial consideration and jury awareness of the vulnerabilities of such evidence.
The Genesis of Turnbull: Addressing Eyewitness Unreliability
Before R v Turnbull, the justice system experienced notable miscarriages of justice that relied heavily on eyewitness accounts. These cases highlighted the susceptibility of memory to suggestion and distortion, raising concerns about the reliability of visual identifications. The Devlin Report, commissioned following a number of high profile miscarriages of justice, explicitly examined the problems of reliance on eyewitness testimony and made recommendations to improve judicial direction. The subsequent judgment in R v Turnbull directly responded to the issues identified in the Devlin Report by formalizing the procedures trial judges should follow. This involved emphasizing that the jury must be made aware of the potential for honest mistakes by witnesses. This crucial point recognizes that even witnesses with no intention to deceive may make erroneous identifications. The legal system, through this case, began to actively acknowledge and address the inherent challenges posed by eyewitness evidence.
The Core Directives of the Turnbull Guidelines
The R v Turnbull guidelines mandate that a trial judge must provide a specific direction to the jury in cases where the prosecution's case depends substantially, or entirely, on eyewitness identification. First, the judge is required to explicitly caution the jury about the special need for caution before convicting the accused based on such evidence. The judge should explain the reasons for such warning. The basis of this caution is the recognized possibility that even an apparently convincing witness might be mistaken. Second, the judge must direct the jury to carefully examine the circumstances in which the witness had the opportunity to observe the accused. This examination should include details such as the distance, the lighting conditions, and the duration of observation. Furthermore, the judge must remind the jury of any weaknesses in the identification evidence. The guidance ensures that the jury considers both the strengths and limitations of the presented identification accounts.
Qualitative Assessment of Eyewitness Evidence
R v Turnbull further instructs trial judges to emphasize to the jury the need for a qualitative, rather than a merely quantitative, assessment of identification evidence. This means that the weight of the evidence should not be determined solely by the number of witnesses who identified the accused. The court acknowledges the inherent weakness in relying purely on the sheer number of witnesses. The case of Adolf Beck, who was wrongly convicted despite numerous witnesses identifying him as the perpetrator, serves as a stark reminder that multiple eyewitness identifications can still be incorrect. This guidance is intended to promote critical evaluation of the context and quality of each identification, rather than an uncritical acceptance of the combined statements. The focus should always remain on the circumstances of each individual identification and not merely the quantity of identifications made.
The Role of Expert Evidence and Its Exclusion
The Turnbull guidelines primarily concern judicial directions to juries. However the question remains regarding the admission of expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness reliability itself. This question remains a subject of ongoing discussion, with courts generally adopting a cautious approach to expert evidence. The judiciary is reluctant to allow expert evidence on eyewitness identification, arguing that it encroaches on the jury’s role as the fact-finders in a trial. The courts maintain that the jury is capable of reaching its own conclusions about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, particularly when aided by clear judicial directions based on R v Turnbull. The case of R v Turner highlights the court's view that expert evidence is not required where the jury is fully capable of forming its own opinion. The fear is that juries might defer unduly to expert opinion, effectively abdicating their duty to assess the facts. Furthermore, there are concerns about the practical implications of routinely allowing such expert testimony, including increased costs and time for trials.
Case Law and Continued Application of Turnbull
The Turnbull guidelines have been consistently upheld and applied in subsequent case law, demonstrating their continued relevance to the criminal justice system. Cases following R v Turnbull have further refined and elaborated on the initial directions. The judiciary's stance continues to be that the Turnbull directions provide sufficient protection against unreliable eyewitness identifications. The legal system seeks to maintain a balance between the recognition of the weaknesses of eyewitness testimony and the preservation of the jury’s role as the ultimate decision-maker. The core principles outlined in Turnbull provide a benchmark for the evaluation of eyewitness evidence in trials. Judges continue to apply and interpret the judgment’s principles when directing juries in such cases. The application of Turnbull demonstrates the complex relationship between judicial instruction and the presentation of eyewitness identification during trials.
Conclusion
The R v Turnbull judgment provides a foundational framework for managing the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification in the English and Welsh legal system. It directly addresses the issues raised by significant miscarriages of justice arising from mistaken identity. The guidelines mandate specific judicial directions to juries, ensuring that they are fully aware of the potential for error when relying on visual identification. This emphasis on careful consideration of circumstances surrounding identifications and qualitative assessment of the accounts provided by witnesses highlights the importance of rigorous scrutiny. The court’s reluctance to routinely admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification remains a critical point of discussion, as courts prioritize the role of the jury and the implementation of Turnbull directions. While the application of the Turnbull guidelines has improved the approach to eyewitness identification, it remains an area where continuous reflection and reevaluation of legal practices are necessary. The complex interaction between witness testimony and the potential for error necessitates continued vigilance by legal professionals and a clear understanding of the principles established in R v Turnbull. The case continues to be a reference point in understanding the management of eyewitness identification in criminal cases.
