Introduction
The case of R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690 examines the legal principles surrounding causation in criminal law, specifically the concept of novus actus interveniens, or a new intervening act. This doctrine addresses circumstances where an event, occurring after the defendant's actions, may break the chain of causation, thus absolving the defendant of criminal liability for the final outcome. This principle requires an assessment of whether the subsequent event was sufficiently independent of the defendant's actions to be considered a separate and distinct cause. Crucially, a novus actus interveniens must be voluntary, exhibiting a free and unfettered volition, to sever the causal link established by the defendant's initial conduct. The legal test for causation, as clarified in R v Wallace, involves determining whether the defendant's act was an "operating and significant" cause of the eventual outcome, a standard modified from the previous "operating and substantial" test.
The Facts of R v Wallace
In R v Wallace, the defendant (D) poured acid on the victim (V), his former partner, resulting in severe disfigurement, as well as considerable physical and psychological suffering. Months following the assault, V traveled to Belgium, where, experiencing further medical complications and ongoing agony, he sought and received lawful euthanasia through a doctor's injection. The prosecution brought several charges, notably including murder. D's legal team argued that the doctor's administration of a lethal injection constituted a novus actus interveniens, breaking the chain of causation between the acid attack and V's subsequent death. The defense contended, therefore, that D could not be held legally responsible for V's death. The Crown Court initially accepted this argument, withdrawing the murder charge from consideration by the jury. This decision was subsequently appealed by the prosecution.
The Court of Appeal’s Analysis of Novus Actus Interveniens
The Court of Appeal, under the direction of Sharp LJ, overturned the Crown Court’s ruling, emphasizing that the requirement for a novus actus interveniens necessitates an act of "free and unfettered volition." According to the judgment in R v Wallace, the court argued that V's decision to seek euthanasia, prompted by his immense suffering stemming directly from D's acid attack, was not an independent and discrete event sufficient to qualify as a novus actus. The Court of Appeal stressed that V's decision was a direct response to the suffering inflicted by D. Furthermore, the Court held that the doctor's actions were a logical continuation of V's situation, carrying out what he could not execute himself, hence lacking the requisite independence. The court highlighted that the acts were inextricably linked to D’s initial conduct. Sharp LJ concluded that the jury could reasonably determine that the actions of V and the doctors were not "sensibly divisible" from the events set in motion by D’s actions.
The Court of Appeal's analysis in R v Wallace specifically rejected the interpretation that the request for and administration of euthanasia were acts of free choice. The court determined that the circumstances placed V under considerable pressure, directly stemming from the injuries inflicted by D. This pressure was understood to negate any sense of unfettered volition required for a novus actus interveniens to apply. As such, the chain of causation was not broken. This finding underscores the principle that an intervening act must be truly independent and not a direct consequence of the defendant's initial conduct to absolve them of responsibility.
Shifting the Test for Legal Causation
The decision in R v Wallace also addressed the appropriate test for establishing legal causation in criminal cases. The Court of Appeal clarified that the correct approach requires assessing whether the injuries inflicted by the defendant were an "operating and significant" cause of death. This standard differs from the previous "operating and substantial" test used in criminal law. This shift indicates a lower threshold for establishing causation. According to Herring’s commentary, even if a jury is persuaded that the doctor’s actions were a primary cause of death, the initial injury caused by the defendant could still be considered a significant contribution to the outcome. This altered test for legal causation emphasizes a pragmatic, common-sense approach rather than a rigid adherence to philosophical analysis. The court emphasized that causation should be determined based on the particular circumstances of each case. The "significant" cause test does not require that the defendant's act be the main or primary cause of the victim's death but rather that it plays a noteworthy role in the chain of events leading to the final outcome.
Applying the Principles to R v Wallace
The Court of Appeal applied these principles to the facts of R v Wallace. It determined that the jury could reasonably conclude that the actions of V in seeking euthanasia and the doctors in administering it were not separate or independent of the acid attack perpetrated by D. The court held that these actions were a consequence of the physical and psychological distress inflicted by the defendant and thus, were not a discrete and voluntary occurrence that could break the chain of causation. According to the judgement, the Court of Appeal concluded that the jury could find that D’s conduct had made a significant contribution to V’s death. The court further noted that V's seeking of death as a response to the inflicted injuries, similar to the suicide in Dear, did not prevent a jury from finding D's conduct to be a significant contributing factor in V's eventual death.
Commentary on R v Wallace
The commentary surrounding R v Wallace highlights the nuanced interpretation of "unfettered" volition and the shift from "substantial" to "significant" causation. J. Herring notes that neither V nor the doctors acted with complete freedom. The court highlighted that they were operating under considerable pressure because of D’s act. Furthermore, it is not entirely apparent how the courts will interpret this “unfettered” requirement in cases moving forward. Herring suggests that a comparison could be drawn with Kennedy where a drug user was also under pressure due to their drug addiction, thus raising questions about whether any decisions made under such influences can truly be considered "unfettered". The change in terminology from ‘substantial’ to ‘significant’ is also considered important. The use of the word significant indicates that even if the doctor’s role is deemed to be the primary cause of death, D’s actions can still be considered a significant, albeit secondary, cause. These points further the understanding of the subtleties involved in determining legal causation, emphasizing how courts are using common sense interpretations to establish legal responsibility.
Conclusion
The case of R v Wallace provides significant clarification on the principles of causation and novus actus interveniens within criminal law. The decision reinforces that for an intervening act to break the chain of causation, it must be truly independent and not a result of the defendant’s actions. In this specific instance, the Court of Appeal found that both the victim's decision to seek euthanasia and the doctor’s execution of it, were too closely linked to D’s actions to constitute an independent event. This case has additionally modified the legal test for causation, establishing that the defendant's conduct needs to be an "operating and significant" cause of the result, rather than an "operating and substantial" cause. This shift lowers the burden of establishing causation and aligns legal principles with a more practical, common-sense understanding. The decision highlights the importance of context and circumstance in assessing causation, emphasizing that legal analysis should be based on the particularities of each individual case. R v Wallace serves as a pivotal point in criminal jurisprudence, particularly concerning the complexities of causation in cases involving grievous bodily harm.
