R v Wilson [1997] QB 47

Facts

• Alan Wilson was charged under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for branding his initials on his wife's buttocks with a hot knife.
• The act was performed with his wife's explicit consent; she had instigated the idea.
• The defence argued that her consent negated the criminality of assault.
• The lower court, relying on R v Brown, held that consent could not be a defence for actual bodily harm caused in such circumstances.
• The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues

1. Whether consent can be a valid defence to a charge under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 in cases involving consensual harm.
2. Whether the facts of R v Wilson were distinguishable from those in R v Brown and Donovan, particularly regarding the motivation, context, and public interest implications.
3. Whether the State should intervene in consensual private acts between adults that result in bodily harm.

Decision

• The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the facts were distinguishable from R v Brown.
• The court found no hostile intent or aggression and characterised the branding as a form of personal adornment akin to professional tattooing.
• It was determined that the activity, occurring in the privacy of the matrimonial home with mutual consent, was not appropriate for criminal sanction.
• The court concluded that consent could be a defence in cases such as Wilson, where no aggressive intent or public harm was present.

Legal Principles

• Consent may serve as a defence to assault occasioning actual bodily harm in circumstances lacking aggression and akin to accepted practices (such as tattooing).
• The precedent from R v Brown does not constitute a blanket prohibition against consent as a defence for all ABH cases; the context and intent are key.
• The public interest in prosecuting consensual private acts between adults is limited, and state intervention should be reserved for situations involving serious harm or societal risk.
• Personal autonomy and privacy are significant interests that the courts recognised should rarely be overridden by criminal law.

Conclusion

R v Wilson clarified that consent can be a defence to actual bodily harm when the harm arises from consensual, non-aggressive, private acts akin to legitimate practices such as tattooing, distinguishing such cases from those involving violence or sadomasochism as in R v Brown.