Facts
- Congress authorized the Alexandria & Washington Railroad Company to extend into the District of Columbia, permitting service of process on “any director of the company.”
- A later congressional grant of additional powers was conditioned on the requirement that “no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color.”
- The Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Railroad Company succeeded to the earlier company’s charter, rights, and privileges.
- The line was operated on a joint account involving a receiver for the District segment and lessees for the Virginia segment; tickets continued to be issued in the company’s name without racial designation.
- On February 8, 1868, Catharine Brown, a Black woman, bought a ticket from Alexandria to Washington.
- Two passenger cars of similar comfort were present; by company regulation one was reserved for white passengers and the other for Black passengers.
- Brown entered the car reserved for white passengers, refused to move, and was forcibly ejected by an employee, suffering injury and humiliation.
- Brown sued the railroad for damages for wrongful expulsion and resulting injuries.
Issues
- Whether service of process on a person “reputed to be” a director satisfied a charter provision authorizing service on “any director of the company.”
- Whether the railroad corporation could be held liable to a passenger for a wrongful expulsion when operations were conducted by lessees and a receiver, but the business was carried on in the corporation’s name.
- Whether a federal condition that “no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color” allowed separate cars for Black passengers if equal in quality, or required access to the same cars as white passengers.
Decision
- Service of process was sufficient where the marshal served a person “reputed” to be a director, the record showed he had recently been a director, and there was no proof he was not a director at service.
- The railroad corporation was liable because it permitted tickets to be issued in its name and held itself out as the carrier, despite leasing and receivership arrangements.
- The federal condition barred racial segregation in separate cars; it required that passengers of color be allowed to ride in the same cars as white passengers.
- The judgment for Brown was affirmed.
Legal Principles
- When a charter authorizes service on a corporate director, a return showing service on a person reputed to be a director, supported by evidence of recent directorship and unrefuted as to current status, can satisfy the charter’s service requirement.
- A carrier that publicly holds itself out as the operator (including issuing tickets in its name) may be responsible in tort to passengers for misconduct by those operating the line with its apparent authority, even under lease or receivership.
- A statutory command that no person be excluded from railroad cars “on account of color” prohibits excluding Black passengers from cars used by white passengers and is not satisfied by providing separate cars, even if comparable in comfort.
Conclusion
The Court enforced Congress’s anti-exclusion condition by requiring integrated access to passenger cars, upheld jurisdiction based on service on a reputed director, and imposed tort liability on the railroad because it held itself out as the passenger carrier despite third-party operation.