## Facts

- Oklahoma amended its firearms laws to make it a crime (except as required by federal law) to maintain a policy that effectively prohibits a person from transporting and storing a firearm in a locked vehicle in a parking area set aside for motor vehicles.
- The amendments also created a private cause of action for employees or invitees affected by such policies.
- Several Oklahoma employers maintained workplace-violence policies barring firearms on company property, including inside employees’ vehicles parked in company lots.
- The employers asserted that allowing firearms in vehicles would increase workplace-violence risks and could expose them to liability and enforcement under the OSH Act’s general duty clause, which requires employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm.
- The employers sued state officials to enjoin enforcement, claiming federal preemption (primarily by the OSH Act), unconstitutional vagueness, and unconstitutional taking/substantive due process violations.
- The district court found conflict preemption under the OSH Act’s general duty clause and permanently enjoined enforcement of the statutes; the state officials appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the OSH Act, including the general duty clause and OSHA’s regulatory scheme, preempts Oklahoma statutes that bar employers from prohibiting firearms stored in locked vehicles in employer parking lots.
2. Whether the statutes effect a compensable taking by limiting employers’ right to exclude firearms from their property.
3. Whether the statutes violate substantive due process.
4. Whether the statutes are void for vagueness.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.
- The court held the OSH Act did not expressly or by field preemption displace the Oklahoma statutes, and OSHA had not issued a standard regulating firearms in parking lots.
- The court rejected conflict and obstacle preemption, concluding the OSH Act’s general duty clause did not require employers to prohibit firearms in locked vehicles and that compliance with both state and federal law was possible.
- The court rejected the takings claim, concluding the statutes did not impose a compensable taking of the employers’ property rights.
- The court applied rational basis review and held the statutes did not violate substantive due process.
- The court held the statutes provided sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and did not permit arbitrary enforcement, so they were not unconstitutionally vague.
- The case was remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction and enter judgment for the state officials on all claims.

## Legal Principles

- OSH Act preemption generally depends on whether OSHA has promulgated a specific occupational safety and health standard addressing the same issue; absent such a standard, state regulation is less likely to be displaced.
- The OSH Act’s general duty clause is broad and does not, by itself, mandate a particular hazard-control method that would create an unavoidable conflict with contrary state law.
- Conflict preemption requires either impossibility of dual compliance or a state law that obstructs federal objectives; generalized federal safety goals, without a concrete federal regulatory requirement on the subject, are insufficient.
- A regulation limiting an owner’s preferred exclusion of certain items or conduct from property does not necessarily constitute a per se taking; reasonable public-safety regulation may be permissible without compensation.
- Under rational basis review, a statute regulating firearms may satisfy substantive due process if it is reasonably related to legitimate state interests.
- A statute is not void for vagueness if it gives ordinary people fair notice of what is prohibited and provides standards that limit arbitrary enforcement.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma’s statutes protecting the ability to store firearms in locked vehicles in parking lots were not preempted by the OSH Act and were constitutional, requiring dissolution of the injunction and entry of judgment for the state officials.


Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009)