## Facts

- An eight-year-old pedestrian, Jerry Ranard, was struck by an автомобile driven by Kathy O’Neil around 9:00 p.m. on a Helena, Montana street.
- Road conditions were snow-packed and icy; the area was lit by street lights.
- Ranard was returning home from a boxing lesson; his older brother and the instructor had double-parked across from the Ranard home.
- The brother crossed the street first; Ranard followed shortly thereafter.
- Near the middle of the street, Ranard saw headlights, stopped, and then ran in an attempt to avoid the vehicle.
- O’Neil braked but could not avoid the collision.
- Ranard suffered injuries requiring weeks of hospitalization and a leg cast.
- In a deposition about eight and a half months later, Ranard testified he did not look for traffic immediately before entering the vehicle’s path and had “forgotten” the rule to check for traffic, though he acknowledged some prior safety instruction.

## Issues

1. Whether an eight-year-old child may be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law on summary judgment when the child’s capacity (age, experience, intelligence, and capabilities) is central to the analysis.
2. Whether alleged violations of pedestrian statutes by a child justify summary judgment on contributory negligence.

## Decision

- The Montana Supreme Court vacated the district court’s summary judgment for O’Neil and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that the record did not establish, as a matter of law, Ranard’s capacity for contributory negligence or that he was contributorily negligent.
- The court rejected treating alleged statutory violations as dispositive of a child’s contributory negligence on summary judgment.
- The court left related doctrines raised in the pleadings (including last clear chance, assumption of risk, and sudden emergency) for consideration in further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A child’s contributory negligence is measured by a child-capacity standard considering the child’s age, experience, intelligence, and capabilities, rather than an adult standard.
- Capacity for contributory negligence, and whether the child acted negligently under that standard, are ordinarily questions of fact for the fact-finder.
- Summary judgment is improper where genuine issues of material fact remain, particularly when determination depends on evaluating a child’s capacity and conduct from written discovery without live testimony.
- A statutory violation may be evidence of negligence, but it does not automatically establish contributory negligence as a matter of law for a child when capacity is disputed.

## Conclusion

The court vacated summary judgment because an eight-year-old’s capacity and alleged contributory negligence could not be conclusively determined from the written record; those issues generally must be decided by the fact-finder under a child-specific capacity standard, and statutory violations do not automatically bar the child’s claim.


Ranard v. O'Neil, 531 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1975)