## Facts

- The case arose after the well-known “Fountain Valley” murder trial in St. Croix, a racially charged prosecution that drew intense local and national attention and was widely discussed because of its social and economic impact on the Virgin Islands.
- Plaintiffs William M. Kunstler, Margaret Ratner, and Leroy A. Mercer were defense counsel associated with that trial. Kunstler was a nationally prominent defense lawyer who frequently participated in controversial, highly publicized cases and voluntarily entered the St. Croix case without invitation and without pay.
- Kunstler invited Ratner to join the defense team. At trial, Kunstler and Ratner took a leading role in courtroom strategy and presentation; the record described them as engaging in aggressive tactics and close association with the defendants’ disruptive behavior toward the presiding judge.
- Defendant Judge Warren H. Young presided over the Fountain Valley trial.
- During the trial, a Maryland (Baltimore) state judge wrote Judge Young a letter complimenting Young’s conduct of the proceedings and stating that he sympathized with Young’s position because he had presided over an earlier notorious case in which Kunstler had become involved and similar tactics had been used; the letter compared the tactics in St. Croix to those used in the Maryland case.
- After the Fountain Valley defendants were convicted and sentenced, The St. Croix Avis published an article about the trial and reprinted the Maryland judge’s letter.
- Plaintiffs sued Judge Young, Jerome Dwyer (managing editor of The St. Croix Avis), and Brodhurst Printery, Inc. (publisher), alleging that the reprinted letter was libelous and seeking $4,000,000 in damages. The letter’s author was not sued.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment. One plaintiff, Mario De Chabert, was initially named but was voluntarily dismissed early in the case.

## Issues

1. Whether the published letter, read as a whole and in context, was defamatory (including whether it amounted to libel per se as to the plaintiff-attorneys).
2. Whether publication of the letter in connection with reporting on a notorious criminal trial was protected as fair comment or otherwise privileged discussion of a matter of public interest.
3. Whether Kunstler and Ratner (and the other plaintiff-attorney) were public figures for purposes of commentary about their conduct in the trial, triggering the First Amendment “actual malice” requirement.
4. Whether the summary-judgment record contained evidence from which a reasonable jury could find actual malice—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth—by Judge Young or the newspaper defendants.

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment for all defendants and dismissed the libel action.
- The court treated the Fountain Valley trial and the conduct of the lawyers and judge as matters of strong public interest, and characterized the letter as evaluative commentary connected to that public controversy.
- Kunstler and Ratner were deemed public figures at least for the limited purpose of statements about their role and conduct in the widely publicized trial they voluntarily entered and led.
- Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence sufficient to permit a finding of actual malice by any defendant; the record did not show that defendants published the letter while knowing it was false or while seriously doubting its truth.

## Legal Principles

- A defamation plaintiff who is a public figure (including a limited-purpose public figure in relation to a public controversy) must prove “actual malice”: publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.
- Participation by prominent attorneys in a famous, controversial criminal proceeding can render them public figures for commentary concerning that proceeding and their courtroom conduct.
- Commentary connected to a judicial proceeding of major public interest receives substantial First Amendment protection, particularly when the language is evaluative and directed to the participants’ conduct in the proceeding.
- On summary judgment in a defamation action governed by the actual-malice standard, plaintiffs must point to record evidence that could support a finding of actual malice; speculation, disagreement with the speaker’s evaluation, or lack of proof of subjective doubt is insufficient.

## Conclusion

Ratner v. Young held that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on a libel claim arising from a newspaper’s publication of a third judge’s letter praising the trial judge and commenting on defense counsel’s tactics during a notorious murder trial, because the plaintiff-attorneys were public figures in relation to that controversy and failed to present evidence that any defendant published the letter with actual malice.


Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386 (1979)