## Facts

- Shante Razor purchased a new 2001 Hyundai Sonata GLS from an Illinois dealership; Hyundai manufactured and distributed the vehicle and issued a 60-month/60,000-mile limited warranty.
- The limited warranty promised repair or replacement of Hyundai-supplied components defective in materials or workmanship, excluded non-Hyundai devices/accessories, and disclaimed incidental and consequential damages (including loss of time, inconvenience, and loss of use).
- Shortly after purchase, the vehicle developed recurring no-start problems, requiring multiple tows and repeated dealer repair attempts; the cause was not consistently identified or permanently corrected.
- Razor testified the failures caused missed or late work and significant time and inconvenience arranging towing and transportation.
- Razor also obtained an aftermarket remote starter/alarm system through dealer options; installation was subcontracted to a third party, and Hyundai contended this excluded device caused the electrical/starting problems.

## Issues

1. Whether Razor presented sufficient evidence of damages to support breach of written and implied warranty verdicts.
2. Whether Razor could maintain a Magnuson-Moss implied warranty claim against Hyundai absent direct contractual privity with the manufacturer.
3. Whether Razor failed to prove the defect was within warranty coverage because the starting problem was caused by an excluded aftermarket remote starter/alarm.
4. Whether the warranty’s disclaimer of incidental and consequential damages barred the jury’s awards for aggravation/inconvenience and loss of use.
5. Whether the award of attorney’s fees and costs under Magnuson-Moss could stand.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed the judgment for Razor.
- The court held that Razor’s testimony regarding repeated failures, repair attempts, and resulting losses permitted the jury to find recoverable damages.
- The court rejected Hyundai’s privity defense, treating Hyundai as the “warrantor” subject to suit under Magnuson-Moss for written and implied warranty claims.
- The court held the jury could reasonably find the defect arose from covered vehicle components rather than the excluded aftermarket system.
- The court upheld consequential-damages awards despite the disclaimer because the limited repair remedy could be found to have failed of its essential purpose under Illinois UCC principles.
- The attorney’s fees and costs award remained proper because Razor prevailed on her Magnuson-Moss claims.

## Legal Principles

- A manufacturer that issues the governing written warranty may be sued as a Magnuson-Moss “warrantor,” and lack of direct buyer-manufacturer privity does not necessarily defeat implied warranty relief in that context.
- Damages for breach of warranty may be proven through lay testimony describing recurring defects, unsuccessful repair efforts, and resulting loss of value and consequential harms; credibility and amount are for the jury.
- When a seller’s or warrantor’s exclusive repair-or-replace remedy does not effectively cure defects after reasonable opportunities, a factfinder may conclude the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose.
- A contractual exclusion of incidental or consequential damages may be unenforceable where the limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, permitting recovery for loss of use and related consequential harms.
- A plaintiff need not conclusively disprove every alternative cause; it is enough to present evidence supporting a reasonable finding that covered defects caused the loss.

## Conclusion

The appellate court upheld a consumer’s warranty verdict against an automobile manufacturer, finding sufficient proof of damages, allowing Magnuson-Moss warranty claims against the manufacturer-warrantor despite privity objections, permitting the jury to reject an excluded-aftermarket-cause defense, and affirming consequential damages and fees where repeated unsuccessful repairs supported a finding that the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose.


Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 349 Ill. App. 3d 651, 813 N.E.2d 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004)