## Facts

- Mrs. Hetherington left a sum of money to the Roman Catholic Church in her will for the saying of masses.
- The executors of her estate sought a court determination on whether this bequest constituted a valid charitable trust.
- The question arose whether the saying of masses, as a religious practice, could satisfy the public benefit requirement under the Charities Act 1960.
- The court examined whether the masses were intended to be conducted in public or restricted to private ceremonies.
- The court found that the bequest was for public masses, which were open to the community.

## Issues

1. Whether a gift for the saying of masses could qualify as a charitable trust under the Charities Act 1960.
2. Whether the saying of masses, as a religious practice, satisfies the public benefit requirement necessary for charitable status.
3. Whether there is a distinction between public and private worship in determining charitable status for religious trusts.

## Decision

- The court held that the saying of masses could constitute a valid charitable trust if the masses are conducted in public.
- The bequest in question was deemed valid as the masses were to be said in public, fulfilling the public benefit requirement.
- The court clarified that private religious practices do not meet the standard for public benefit and, thus, cannot be treated as charitable purposes.

## Legal Principles

- The advancement of religion is a recognized charitable purpose, provided it confers a public benefit.
- Charitable trusts must serve purposes that are accessible to the public or a sufficient section of it; private or exclusive purposes are insufficient.
- The public benefit requirement is substantive and must be satisfied through openness and accessibility.
- Religious practices may fulfill the public benefit test when carried out as public worship, but not when restricted to private beneficiaries.

## Conclusion

Re Hetherington [1990] Ch 1 confirms that public worship may qualify as a charitable purpose if it can be shown to benefit the public, while purely private religious practices are insufficient for charitable trust status. This case solidifies the distinction between public and private religious activities within charity law, emphasizing openness and public accessibility as preconditions for charitable recognition.