## Facts

- Mary Reavis worked for Dr. James Slominski, a dentist, at various times starting in 1969; she testified that during the early 1970s he repeatedly fondled her at work despite her objections.
- Reavis left in 1975 and returned in 1988 as a receptionist, asserting she did so only on the condition that he would not touch her.
- After a New Year’s Eve office party on December 31, 1991, Reavis alleged Slominski kissed her against her will and that sexual intercourse occurred after she felt she had no practical choice because she depended on her job and feared losing it.
- Reavis presented evidence of childhood sexual abuse and psychological trauma, asserting it affected her ability to resist and her capacity to give meaningful consent.
- Slominski denied any assault and asserted that any sexual contact was consensual; he also denied knowledge of any condition affecting Reavis’ ability to consent.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence required a directed verdict for Slominski on the sexual-assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims.
2. Whether the sexual-assault jury instructions improperly treated apparent acquiescence as consent by omitting instructions on capacity to consent and economic duress.
3. Whether the verdicts (for Reavis on sexual assault and for Slominski on IIED) were legally inconsistent.
4. On cross-appeal, whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of IIED.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the denial of Slominski’s directed-verdict motions, concluding the evidence created fact questions for the jury.
- The court reversed the judgment for Reavis on the sexual-assault claim and remanded for a new trial because the jury was not properly instructed on the law of consent.
- The instructional error was prejudicial because the central dispute was whether Reavis’ consent, if any, was legally effective in light of claimed incapacity and job-related coercion.
- The court did not order a new trial on IIED based on the same instructional error, leaving the defense verdict on IIED undisturbed.

## Legal Principles

- A directed verdict is improper when reasonable factfinders could differ on material issues; disputes over consent and coercion generally present jury questions.
- In civil sexual-assault claims, apparent agreement does not necessarily establish legally effective consent.
- Consent may be ineffective when the plaintiff lacks capacity to understand the nature of the sexual conduct or the ability to resist because of an abnormal condition supported by evidence.
- In an employment relationship, economic pressure or fear of job loss can constitute duress that may negate the voluntariness of apparent consent.
- When evidence supports theories of incapacity or duress and proper instructions are requested, the jury must be instructed on those doctrines; omission can be reversible error if it likely affected the verdict.

## Conclusion

The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the case could not be resolved as a matter of law because the evidence raised jury questions, but it ordered a new trial on the sexual-assault claim because the jury was not instructed to evaluate whether Reavis’ consent was legally effective in light of potential incapacity and economic duress.


Reavis v. Slominski, 250 Neb. 711, 551 N.W.2d 528 (Neb. 1996)