Facts
- B. F. Reed rode in his automobile, which was driven by his daughter, in Tacoma, Washington near midnight.
- They traveled north on Yakima Avenue through Wright Park toward an intersection where streetcar tracks ran from Division Avenue and turned onto North First Street.
- The daughter did not see the approaching streetcar until the automobile was very close to the tracks and she “suddenly found herself in a position of danger.”
- Believing she was too close to stop safely, she attempted to cross ahead of the streetcar but could not clear the tracks.
- The streetcar struck the rear of the automobile, injuring Reed and damaging the car.
- The defendant streetcar company argued the daughter’s conduct was contributorily negligent, barring Reed’s recovery.
Issues
- Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that if the driver believed she could cross before the streetcar arrived but lacked sufficient time, that “error in judgment” required a verdict for the defendant.
- Whether a mistaken judgment made in an emergency constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Decision
- The Washington Supreme Court reversed the defense judgment and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the challenged instruction misstated the law by making a misjudgment automatically dispositive against the plaintiff.
- The court stated that an “error of judgment is not necessarily negligence.”
Legal Principles
- An “error of judgment” is not negligence per se; liability depends on whether the actor exercised ordinary care under the circumstances.
- In emergency conditions, the fact-finder must evaluate whether the response was that of a reasonably prudent person facing the same apparent danger, not whether the choice was optimal in hindsight.
- A jury instruction that treats a mistaken judgment about time or distance as automatic contributory negligence improperly removes the ordinary-care question from the jury.
Conclusion
Because the jury was instructed to find for the defendant whenever the driver misjudged her ability to cross ahead of the streetcar, the verdict rested on a legal standard that equated mistake with negligence; the judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial under the ordinary-care standard.