## Facts

- Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, and Alberta implemented salary freezes or reductions affecting provincial court judges, often as part of deficit-reduction programs.
- In Prince Edward Island and Manitoba, judges (or their associations) challenged the measures as undermining judicial independence; in Alberta, criminal accused raised the issue in criminal appeals.
- The matters reached the national court through consolidated references and appeals addressing whether remuneration changes compromised the independence and impartiality of provincial court judges.
- The challenges focused on financial security as a component of judicial independence and on whether political branches could adjust judicial pay without institutional safeguards.

## Issues

1. Whether constitutional guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality apply to provincial court judges, including protection of their remuneration.
2. Whether governments may unilaterally reduce or freeze provincial court judges’ salaries without infringing judicial independence.
3. Whether constitutions require an independent, objective, and effective commission process for judicial remuneration, and what legal effect commission recommendations have.
4. Whether unwritten constitutional principles impose enforceable procedural and substantive limits on how governments set judicial pay.

## Decision

- The court held that judicial independence protects all judges, including provincial court judges, and that financial security includes the method by which remuneration is determined.
- The court required governments to establish and consult an independent, objective, and effective judicial compensation commission before altering judicial remuneration.
- The court held that governments are not strictly bound by commission recommendations but must give them serious consideration and may depart only for rational reasons capable of judicial review.
- The court held that general, non-discriminatory, good-faith austerity measures affecting judges are not automatically unconstitutional, but remuneration changes made without the commission safeguard (or that single out judges) can violate independence.
- The court provided forward-looking remedies to bring provincial schemes into compliance and avoided automatic invalidation of prior provincial court decisions.

## Legal Principles

- Judicial independence is constitutionally protected for all courts and is both (a) a litigant-facing guarantee (e.g., impartial adjudication) and (b) an institutional requirement necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.
- The core components of judicial independence include security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence.
- Financial security protects judges from political pressure by requiring that remuneration be set through a process insulated from direct political bargaining with judges.
- An independent, effective, and objective remuneration commission must function as an institutional buffer between the judiciary and political branches.
- Commission recommendations do not bind the government, but departures require rational, reviewable justification grounded in legitimate public policy considerations.

## Conclusion

The court constitutionalized a commission-based process for setting provincial court judicial remuneration, holding that judicial independence—supported by written protections and unwritten constitutional principles—limits unilateral political control over judges’ pay while permitting justified, non-discriminatory fiscal measures implemented through an independent commission framework.


Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Ct. of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.)