## Facts

- Robert Faulkner, a seaman on the *Zemindar*, entered a cargo area without authority to steal rum from casks in the hold.
- He bored a hole in a rum cask with a gimlet; rum flowed out as he attempted to plug the hole.
- While handling a lit match, the rum ignited; Faulkner was burned and the ship caught fire and was destroyed.
- It was conceded there was no evidence Faulkner actually intended to burn the ship.
- The trial judge did not ask the jury to decide whether Faulkner knew the likely consequences of his conduct or acted recklessly regarding the risk of fire.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant can be convicted of “feloniously, unlawfully, and maliciously” setting fire to a ship when the burning was accidental and the jury made no finding of intent, foresight, or recklessness as to the fire.
2. Whether mens rea for an underlying felony (theft) can supply the “maliciously” element for a separate malicious-damage offense arising from an unintended result.

## Decision

- The court quashed the conviction for maliciously setting fire to the ship.
- The court held that “maliciously” required a mental element directed to the burning itself, not merely proof that the defendant was committing another felony when the fire occurred.
- The trial instruction treating intent as immaterial because Faulkner was stealing was erroneous.
- Because the jury was not asked to decide intent, foresight, or recklessness regarding the burning, the required mental element was not established.

## Legal Principles

- For statutory offenses requiring that property be set on fire “maliciously,” the prosecution must prove mens rea relating to the burning (intent or, at minimum, foresight of the harmful result as submitted to and found by the jury).
- Participation in an independent felony does not automatically transfer “malice” to an accidental injury-to-property result under a statute that requires malice.
- Liability based on foreseeable consequences of a defendant’s acts requires a jury finding on foreseeability (and an evidentiary basis); it cannot be presumed solely from the commission of the underlying felony.
- Penal statutes using terms such as “maliciously” are not construed to impose broad constructive liability for unintended harms without proof of the required mental element.

## Conclusion

The court set aside Faulkner’s ship-burning conviction because the statutory requirement of “maliciously” demanded proof—and a jury determination—of intent, foresight, or equivalent culpability as to the fire, which could not be supplied merely by showing that the fire occurred during a theft.


Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox C.C. 550 (Crown Cas. Reserved (Ir.) 1877)