Regina v. Jones, 2 All. E.R. 54 (1976)

Facts

  • Christopher Smith was the adult son of Alfred Smith, who lived at 72 Chapel Lane, Farnborough, where two television sets were kept (one owned by Alfred, and one in his lawful possession).
  • Smith lived elsewhere. John Jones was Smith’s companion that night and also lived elsewhere.
  • In the middle of the night, police noticed a television set protruding from the boot of a car occupied by Smith and Jones and stopped the vehicle.
  • During the stop, officers discovered a second television set inside the car and found that Jones was carrying pliers.
  • After the arrest, police investigation linked the televisions to Alfred Smith’s home; Alfred reported that two televisions had been stolen from his house that night.
  • The scene suggested a surreptitious removal: a cord that had tied a broken window shut had been cut, and the cords of both televisions had also been cut.
  • Smith admitted that he and Jones had taken the televisions, but he claimed he had permission from his father both to enter the house and to take the televisions.
  • Jones claimed he merely accompanied Smith and believed Smith had permission.
  • In police interviews and at trial, Smith and Jones gave inconsistent accounts about where they were taking the televisions, how they entered the house, why they went in the middle of the night, and whether they thought Alfred was at home or asleep.
  • Both defendants were charged with burglary under Theft Act 1968 § 9(1)(b), convicted, and appealed on the basis that Smith’s general permission to enter his father’s house meant neither defendant could have entered “as a trespasser.”

Issues

  1. Whether a person who has a general permission or licence to enter premises can still “enter as a trespasser” for purposes of Theft Act 1968 § 9(1)(b) when entering to steal.
  2. What state of mind is required to treat entry as trespass where the defendant has some permission to enter: must the defendant know he is going beyond permission, or is recklessness enough?

Decision

  • The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeals and affirmed the burglary convictions.
  • The court held that a general permission to enter does not automatically prevent a finding that the entrant was a trespasser for burglary.
  • The jury was entitled to find trespass if the defendants entered knowing they were acting outside the scope of any permission, or being reckless as to whether they were acting outside it.
  • On the evidence (time of entry, the manner of removal, cutting cords, possession of pliers, and inconsistent explanations), the convictions were safe.
  • A general licence to enter premises is not a licence to enter for any purpose whatsoever; it has limits that depend on what the permission actually allows.

  • For burglary under Theft Act 1968 § 9(1)(b), an entrant who has some permission to enter may still be a trespasser if, at the time of entry, he:

    • knows he is going beyond the scope of the permission; or
    • is reckless about whether he is going beyond it.
  • Whether entry exceeds permission can be inferred from context, including the time of entry, the manner of entry or removal of property, use of tools, and the credibility of the defendant’s account.

  • A companion who participates in the entry and removal can also be treated as entering “as a trespasser” if he shares the knowledge or recklessness that the entry is outside any permission relied upon.

Conclusion

Regina v. Jones holds that a defendant cannot avoid burglary liability merely by pointing to a general permission to enter: if the entry is outside the scope of that permission, and the defendant knows that or is reckless about it, the entry is “as a trespasser” for Theft Act 1968 § 9(1)(b), and the burglary conviction may stand.