## Facts

- *Regina v. Ojibway* is a fictional, satirical Canadian “case” published as “Judicial Humour – Construction of a Statute” in a legal periodical rather than a real court judgment.
- Fred Ojibway rode his pony through Queen’s Park on January 2, 1965.
- Being poor and having pawned his saddle, Ojibway used a down (feather) pillow in place of a saddle while riding.
- The pony broke its right foreleg.
- Ojibway shot the pony to end its suffering.
- The Crown charged Ojibway under the Small Birds Act, which made it an offense to “maim[], injur[e] or kill[] small birds,” punishable by a fine.
- The Act defined “bird” as “a two legged animal covered with feathers.”
- A magistrate acquitted Ojibway, reasoning that Ojibway killed a horse/pony, not a bird.
- The Crown appealed by way of a stated case to a higher court styled “IN THE SUPREME COURT,” where “Blue, J.” issued the satirical reasons.

## Issues

1. Whether, for purposes of the Small Birds Act, a pony bearing feathers (because a feather pillow was used as a saddle) falls within the statutory definition of “bird” as “a two legged animal covered with feathers.”
2. Whether the phrase “two legged” limits the definition to animals with only two legs, or instead sets a minimum threshold that does not exclude animals with more legs.
3. Whether the court should read into the definition an unstated requirement that the animal be “naturally” covered with feathers.
4. Whether ordinary-world indicators (the animal’s neighing, its use as a mount, or the presence of iron shoes) can defeat classification under the statutory definition.
5. Whether zoological or other species evidence is relevant where the statute supplies its own definition.

## Decision

- The court allowed the Crown’s appeal from the acquittal.
- The court treated the statutory definition as controlling and stated that the question was not whether the animal was a bird “in fact,” but whether it was a bird “in law” under the Act’s definition.
- The court construed “two legged” as a minimum requirement, reasoning that the legislature could still have intended the definition to include multi-legged animals so long as they had at least two legs.
- The court rejected the defense argument that the Act must be limited to animals “naturally covered” with feathers, reasoning that if the legislature had intended such a limitation it would have said so.
- The court deemed it irrelevant that the animal neighs rather than chirps, noting that the sounds an animal makes do not change what it is for statutory purposes.
- The court also treated as irrelevant that Ojibway rode the animal and that the animal wore iron shoes, reasoning that riding is not prohibited and that “how an animal dresses” does not decide statutory status.
- Applying this literal, definition-centered method, the court concluded that a horse (and therefore a pony) “with feathers on its back” must be treated as a bird, and thus as a “small bird” for the Act.
- On that basis, the magistrate’s acquittal could not stand and Ojibway was held guilty under the Act in the satirical disposition.

## Legal Principles

- When a statute supplies an express definition, the defined meaning governs even where it departs from everyday language.
- A court may treat classification as a legal question driven by the definition section, not by real-world taxonomy.
- Courts should not add limiting words to a definition (such as “naturally”) when the text does not include them.
- A definitional attribute can be read as a threshold rather than an exclusive description, depending on the reading adopted by the court.
- Evidence about common sense, function, or appearance (noise, use, shoes) may be disregarded if the court treats it as outside the definition’s elements.
- As a published satire, the piece illustrates how rigid, literal application of definitions can yield absurd results.

## Conclusion

In this satirical “Judicial Humour” treatment of statutory construction, the “Supreme Court” holds that the Small Birds Act’s definition of “bird” governs and that a pony carrying feathers from a down pillow can be treated as a “small bird” in law, reversing the magistrate’s acquittal and using deadpan reasoning to show how definition-driven interpretation can produce extreme outcomes.


Regina v. Ojibway, 137 Judicial Humour - Construction of a Statute