## Facts

- W. Carlton Rentz died testate in Florida on February 9, 1959, survived by his widow and three minor/adult children.
- At execution of the will and at Rentz’s death, he had no grandchildren.
- Item V of the will gave the “rents and profits” of the residuary estate to the wife and children “share and share alike” for life, with “remainder to my grandchildren, per stirpes.”
- The widow elected dower, effectively leaving the children as the relevant life beneficiaries under the residuary plan.
- The estate consisted entirely of personal property and money; there was no real estate.
- The executrix sought probate construction of Item V to determine proper distribution; a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent potential unborn grandchildren.

## Issues

1. Whether a contingent remainder to “my grandchildren” fails (and reverts) because no grandchildren existed at the testator’s death.
2. Whether Florida’s doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders applies to future interests in personal property rather than land.
3. If the grandchildren’s remainder failed, whether any reversion in the children would merge with their life estates to give the children absolute ownership.

## Decision

- The appellate court affirmed the probate construction order and adopted the county judge’s written order as its opinion.
- The court held the contingent remainder to the testator’s grandchildren was not destroyed and remained effective despite no grandchildren existing at the testator’s death.
- The court concluded the destructibility doctrine did not apply because the residuary estate was personalty, not real property.
- Because the grandchildren’s contingent remainder was preserved, there was no merger of the children’s life estates into any larger vested estate that would defeat the remainder.

## Legal Principles

- Florida’s destructibility of contingent remainders doctrine, though recognized in prior cases, is limited to legal contingent remainders in freehold estates in land and does not govern future interests in pure personal property.
- A testamentary gift “to my grandchildren” following life estates can remain a valid contingent remainder where members of the class may come into existence before the termination of the life estates.
- Merger requires the same person to hold successive interests (e.g., life estate and vested reversion/remainder) in the same right; a subsisting contingent remainder in a different class of takers prevents merger that would extinguish the life estate and defeat the remainder.

## Conclusion

The court construed the will to give the children life interests in the income of the residuary personal estate, while preserving a contingent remainder for any grandchildren born before the death of the last life tenant, rejecting application of destructibility and any merger that would eliminate the unborn grandchildren’s interest.


Rentz v. Unborn Grandchildren of Rentz (In re Estate of Rentz), 152 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963)