## Facts

- Robert Repin owned Kaisa, an Alaskan Malamute, and sought treatment when she became seriously ill.
- Kaisa was admitted to Washington State University’s veterinary teaching hospital, where clinicians diagnosed metastatic cancer with a poor prognosis and significant pain.
- Repin consented to euthanasia to end Kaisa’s suffering.
- Repin alleged the euthanasia injection through a catheter was mishandled, causing Kaisa to awaken in severe distress; staff briefly paused while obtaining additional solution, and Kaisa was then euthanized by a separate intravenous injection.
- Repin alleged he suffered emotional and physical symptoms after witnessing the event and later used alcohol to sleep.
- Repin sued the State, WSU, and a veterinarian involved in the procedure, asserting contract and tort claims and seeking noneconomic (emotional distress) damages.

## Issues

1. Whether Washington law permits emotional distress damages for a reckless breach of a contract for euthanasia of a companion animal.
2. Whether a separate claim for lack of informed consent or negligent misrepresentation by omission is cognizable for veterinary care beyond ordinary professional negligence.
3. Whether the alleged conduct during euthanasia satisfies the elements of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress (outrage).
4. Whether alleged negligent mishandling of a consented-to euthanasia can support conversion or trespass to chattels.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the challenged rulings.
- Emotional distress damages were unavailable as a matter of law on Repin’s reckless breach of contract theory.
- Dismissal of the lack of informed consent/negligent misrepresentation by omission claim was affirmed.
- Dismissal of the outrage claim was affirmed because the alleged conduct did not meet the required level of extreme and atrocious behavior.
- Dismissal of conversion and trespass to chattels was affirmed because the euthanasia was performed with the owner’s consent and negligence does not convert the act into an intentional property tort.

## Legal Principles

- Emotional distress damages for breach of contract are generally unavailable and are allowed only in narrow categories where serious emotional disturbance is particularly likely from the contract’s subject matter.
- A contract for veterinary services involving a companion animal is treated as a contract concerning personal property and does not fall within the limited category permitting emotional distress damages.
- Washington’s informed-consent doctrine for human medical treatment does not create a distinct, parallel veterinary informed-consent cause of action beyond ordinary negligence principles.
- The tort of outrage requires conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency; allegations amounting to a botched or negligent procedure do not satisfy that standard.
- Conversion and trespass to chattels require intentional, unauthorized interference with property; negligent performance of a consented-to procedure does not meet these elements.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed that Washington law does not allow noneconomic emotional distress damages for breach of a pet-euthanasia contract and that claims framed as veterinary informed consent, outrage, or intentional property torts were properly dismissed where the allegations sounded in negligence and the euthanasia occurred with the owner’s consent.


Repin v. State, 198 Wash. App. 243, 392 P.3d 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017)