Facts
- Residential Savings Mortgage, Inc. (Residential), a Florida corporation, had its principal (and only) Florida place of business in Broward County.
- Ramona Keesling resided in Pinellas County, Florida.
- Residential solicited Keesling by telephone in Pinellas County regarding refinancing her home mortgage.
- The refinance transaction was handled by telephone and mail, but the loan closing occurred in Broward County (Sunrise, Florida), and funds were disbursed there.
- Keesling alleged Residential misrepresented that her total monthly mortgage payment would not exceed about $700, while knowing the payment (including escrow) would be about $1,200 and unaffordable on her fixed income.
- After refinancing, Keesling alleged she could not make the first payment and ultimately entered into a reverse mortgage on her Pinellas County home to pay off the refinance loan, which she alleged caused her to lose home equity.
- Keesling sued in Pinellas County circuit court and asserted tort-based claims (including negligence and fraud) arising from the refinance transaction; Potomac Mortgage Capital Incorporated was also named as a defendant.
- Residential moved to transfer venue to Broward County under section 47.051, Florida Statutes (2007), arguing Broward County was proper because (1) its only Florida office was there and (2) the causes of action accrued there at the closing; Residential also asserted no real property was “in litigation.”
- Residential supported its venue motion with an affidavit establishing its office location and that the closing occurred in Broward County.
- Keesling filed no counter-affidavit and did not dispute the Broward County closing; she argued venue was proper in Pinellas County because she suffered harm there when she later obtained the reverse mortgage.
- The trial court denied the motion to transfer venue, and Residential took a nonfinal appeal.
Issues
- Whether the trial court erred in denying Residential’s motion to transfer venue from Pinellas County to Broward County under section 47.051 when Residential’s affidavit showed its only Florida office was in Broward County and the refinance closing occurred there, and Keesling filed no counter-affidavit.
- For venue purposes on tort claims tied to a refinance transaction, whether the claims “accrued” in Pinellas County based on later financial consequences there, rather than in Broward County where the closing occurred.
Decision
- The Second District reversed the nonfinal order denying Residential’s motion to transfer venue.
- The court held Broward County was the proper venue under section 47.051.
- The court concluded the causes of action accrued in Broward County because the closing there was the last event necessary for liability and the point at which Keesling first suffered compensable harm.
- The court rejected Keesling’s argument that later economic effects in Pinellas County made venue proper there.
- The case was remanded with directions to transfer the action to Broward County.
Legal Principles
- Under section 47.051, Florida Statutes (2007), a domestic corporation may be sued in the county where it has an office for the transaction of its customary business, or where the cause of action accrued; the “property in litigation” option does not apply when the suit seeks money damages and no real property is at issue.
- In tort cases, the cause of action accrues in the county where the last event necessary to create liability occurs and where the plaintiff first suffers injury sufficient to support a claim for damages.
- For tort claims arising from a refinance transaction, the loan closing can be the event that fixes accrual for venue purposes because it completes the transaction and can be when compensable damages first occur.
- When a defendant supports a venue motion with a sworn affidavit establishing venue facts, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present competent evidence (such as a counter-affidavit) showing the chosen venue is proper; absent such evidence, the affidavit’s facts control.
- An amended pleading does not change the venue outcome when it does not alter the venue facts that determine where the claims accrued.
Conclusion
The court ordered transfer to Broward County because Residential established by unrebutted affidavit that its only Florida office was in Broward County and that the refinance closing occurred there, which was the last act for liability and the point of first compensable injury; Keesling’s later financial consequences in Pinellas County did not make venue proper in Pinellas County under section 47.051.