## Facts

- Hungary’s National Assembly enacted Act IV of 1991 to permit prosecution of serious offenses committed between 21 December 1944 and 2 May 1990 that allegedly were not prosecuted “for political reasons.”
- The Act aimed to restart statutes of limitation as of 2 May 1990, including for offenses whose limitation periods had already expired under the law applicable when the conduct occurred.
- The President of the Republic refused to promulgate the Act and sought prior abstract constitutional review.
- The challenge asserted violations of the constitutional state/rule-of-law principle, the criminal-law legality principle (nullum crimen sine lege), legal certainty, equality, and the ban on arbitrariness.

## Issues

1. Whether legislation may retroactively restart or otherwise alter limitation periods, including reviving already time-barred criminal liability, consistent with the rule-of-law principle and legal certainty.
2. Whether retroactively creating causes of suspension or interruption of limitation violates the constitutional prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation and the legality principle.
3. Whether the Act’s reliance on undefined criteria—particularly whether non-prosecution occurred “for political reasons”—is impermissibly vague under criminal-law legality and legal certainty requirements.
4. Whether conditioning prosecution on the State’s past political motives creates arbitrary and unequal treatment among similarly situated offenders.

## Decision

- The Constitutional Court granted the President’s petition and held Act IV of 1991 unconstitutional in its entirety, preventing promulgation.
- The Court ruled that retroactively restarting limitation, including where limitation had already expired, unconstitutionally revived extinguished criminal liability.
- The Court held that retroactive legislative creation of grounds to suspend or interrupt limitation is unconstitutional, and such grounds cannot be supplied by analogy.
- The Court found the Act unconstitutionally vague because key operative terms lacked clear, objective legal meaning.
- The Court concluded that differentiating offenders based on whether the State previously refrained from prosecution for “political reasons” was arbitrary and violated equality guarantees.

## Legal Principles

- Rule-of-law legal certainty protects settled legal relations; once limitation has expired, the extinguishment of criminal liability cannot be reversed by later legislation.
- The prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation bars laws that retroactively worsen an accused’s position, including by reviving time-barred offenses or retroactively extending limitation through new interruption/suspension rules.
- Criminal legislation must be sufficiently clear and foreseeable; indeterminate standards that determine criminal exposure violate legality and legal certainty.
- For limitation purposes, the State may not treat similarly situated offenders differently based on the State’s prior reasons for inaction; politically defined distinctions in prosecutorial eligibility are impermissibly arbitrary.

## Conclusion

The Court invalidated Hungary’s attempt to reopen prosecutions for serious historical offenses by retroactively restarting limitation periods and by using vague, politically framed criteria; the ruling treated expired limitation as a constitutionally protected finality interest and required clarity, equality, and non-retroactivity in criminal legislation even during democratic transition.


Retroactive Criminal Legislation Case (Decision 11/1992 (III. 5.) AB) (Hung. Const. Ct. 1992)