## Facts

- Banks obtained a horse from its owner based on a limited and specific permission: to carry a child to a nearby doctor.
- Banks used the horse for the permitted errand and took the child to the doctor.
- After completing the permitted use, Banks did not return the horse as expected and instead rode it in another direction.
- While still in possession of the horse, Banks was offered money for it and sold the horse to the buyer.
- There was no proof that Banks intended to steal or sell the horse at the time he first received it from the owner; the intent to appropriate arose only after the lawful borrowing.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant commits common-law larceny when he initially receives a chattel with the owner’s consent and without intent to steal, but later decides to appropriate it and sells it.
2. Whether the element of felonious intent in larceny must exist at the moment of the taking (so that intent and trespass coincide).

## Decision

- The court set aside the conviction for horse stealing.
- Because Banks obtained the horse with the owner’s consent and without proof of felonious intent at the time of receipt, the later decision to sell did not satisfy the elements of common-law larceny.
- The court treated the later sale as a wrongful conversion following lawful possession, which did not supply the missing trespassory taking required for larceny.

## Legal Principles

- Common-law larceny requires a trespassory taking and carrying away of another’s property accompanied by felonious intent at the time of the taking.
- If the accused initially acquires possession lawfully or innocently (by the owner’s consent), a later-formed intent to appropriate or a later conversion does not retroactively make the original taking larcenous.
- The requirement that trespass and felonious intent coincide limits larceny and leaves some conduct (lawful acquisition followed by misappropriation) outside larceny absent another applicable offense.

## Conclusion

The court held that Banks could not be convicted of horse stealing because the horse was obtained with the owner’s consent for a limited purpose and there was no proof of intent to steal at the moment of receipt; the later sale showed conversion, but not common-law larceny.


Rex v. Banks, 168 Eng. Rep. 887 (Crown Cas. Res. 1821)