## Facts

- Bonnie Richardson worked as a receptionist/switchboard operator for First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Valdosta, Inc.
- J.R. Hennly, Jr., a vice president/administrative officer at First Federal, worked in an office about 30 feet from Richardson and regularly smoked a pipe at work.
- Richardson experienced adverse physical symptoms from the pipe smoke (including nausea, pain, headaches, anxiety, weight loss) and repeatedly reported her reactions to supervisors.
- First Federal placed air cleaners in and near Hennly’s office; Hennly temporarily switched to cigarettes but later resumed pipe smoking.
- Richardson presented unrebutted medical evidence attributing her illness to pipe-smoke exposure and was hospitalized twice; Hennly knew of her reactions and hospitalizations.
- The record contained disputes over whether Hennly intentionally exposed Richardson to smoke to annoy or harm her and whether he made teasing or offensive remarks.
- After Richardson returned from her second hospitalization, First Federal terminated her employment, citing excessive absenteeism.
- Richardson sued First Federal for (1) violation of the Georgia Equal Employment for the Handicapped Code (GEEHC), (2) battery, and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); she sued Hennly for battery, IIED, and interference with contractual relations.
- The trial court granted Hennly summary judgment on battery and IIED (but not interference) and denied First Federal summary judgment on all claims; both sides appealed, and the appeals were consolidated.

## Issues

1. Whether the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred Richardson’s tort claims against her coworker and employer, or whether the “personal reasons/personal animosity” exception applied.
2. Whether disputed facts permitted a jury to find battery based on workplace pipe-smoke exposure.
3. Whether disputed facts permitted a jury to find “extreme and outrageous” conduct supporting IIED.
4. Whether Richardson’s smoke sensitivity and resulting illness could qualify her as a “handicapped individual” under the GEEHC, precluding summary judgment for the employer.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to Hennly on battery and IIED, holding that jury issues existed on intent, contact, causation, and outrageousness.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment to First Federal, allowing the GEEHC claim (and related tort theories) to proceed.
- The Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence could support application of the Workers’ Compensation Act’s “personal reasons” exception because Hennly’s conduct could be found personally motivated rather than job-related.
- On later review, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding the Workers’ Compensation Act barred the tort claims and that Richardson did not meet the GEEHC definition of a “handicapped individual”; on remand, the Court of Appeals vacated its earlier decision and entered judgment consistent with that mandate.

## Legal Principles

- Workers’ compensation exclusivity generally bars tort claims for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment; the “personal reasons/personal animosity” exception turns on whether the willful act is directed at the employee for reasons personal to the employee rather than work-related.
- For battery, harmful or offensive contact may be accomplished through an intentionally directed substance, and intent and causation questions typically preclude summary judgment when the record supports competing inferences.
- For IIED, whether conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous may be for the jury where material facts about the defendant’s conduct and intent are disputed.
- Under the GEEHC, a plaintiff must meet the statutory definition of “handicapped individual,” including an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity (or a record of, or being regarded as having, such an impairment).

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals held that disputed facts permitted Richardson to pursue battery and IIED claims based on pipe-smoke exposure and to proceed on a GEEHC claim, including under a theory that workers’ compensation exclusivity did not apply due to personal animosity; the Georgia Supreme Court later rejected those conclusions, holding the tort claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act and that Richardson did not qualify as handicapped under the GEEHC.


Richardson v. Hennly, 209 Ga. App. 868, 434 S.E.2d 772 (Ct. App. 1993)