## Facts

- Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and a third accomplice were charged in Michigan state court with robbery, assault, and murders arising from a home invasion.
- Marsh and Williams were tried jointly.
- The prosecution introduced Williams’s confession, but redacted it to eliminate Marsh’s name and any reference to her existence, leaving only Williams and an unnamed third accomplice.
- The confession included a statement that, while driving to the victims’ home, the accomplice said he would have to kill the victims after robbing them.
- The trial court instructed the jury that the confession could not be used against Marsh.
- Williams did not testify, so Marsh could not cross-examine him about the confession.
- Marsh testified that she was in the car with Williams and the third accomplice but did not hear their conversation and did not intend to rob or kill anyone.
- The jury convicted Marsh of felony murder and assault with intent to murder; state appellate review was unsuccessful.
- On federal habeas review, the Sixth Circuit granted relief, holding that the confession violated the Confrontation Clause under Bruton because other properly admitted evidence could link Marsh to the redacted confession.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is violated at a joint trial when a nontestifying codefendant’s confession is admitted with a limiting instruction after being redacted to remove any reference to the defendant’s existence, even though other evidence may allow the jury to infer the defendant’s involvement.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld the conviction.
- The Court held that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name but any reference to the defendant’s existence.
- The Court declined to extend Bruton to confessions that are not incriminating on their face but become incriminating only when linked with other trial evidence.
- The Court relied on the general presumption that juries follow limiting instructions, treating Bruton as a narrow exception limited to facially incriminating confessions.

## Legal Principles

- Bruton applies to a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that is facially incriminating as to the defendant; it does not apply when the confession is redacted to remove any reference to the defendant’s existence and incriminates, if at all, only through linkage with other evidence.
- When incrimination depends on inferential linkage to other evidence, limiting instructions are generally presumed effective for Confrontation Clause purposes.
- Joint trials remain permissible where a codefendant confession is sanitized to avoid facial implication of the defendant and the jury is instructed to consider it only against the declarant.

## Conclusion

The Court held that admitting a nontestifying codefendant’s confession at a joint trial does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the confession is redacted to eliminate any reference to the defendant and the jury receives a limiting instruction, even if other evidence could lead jurors to infer the defendant’s involvement.


Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)