## Facts

- California’s constitution and statutes barred persons convicted of certain felonies from voting unless their rights were restored.
- Abran Ramirez and other individuals with felony convictions, who had completed their sentences and paroles, were denied voter registration in various California counties based on those provisions.
- The respondents filed a class petition in the California Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandate, alleging the disenfranchisement scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- During the state proceedings, some county election officials declined to contest the challenge and indicated they would begin registering ex-felons whose sentences and paroles had expired.
- The California Supreme Court added Viola N. Richardson, a county clerk and registrar of voters, as a defendant; the California Secretary of State remained a party.

## Issues

1. Whether the controversy was moot given some local officials’ decision not to contest the action and to register ex-felons.
2. Whether California’s disenfranchisement of persons convicted of felonies who had completed sentence and parole violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held the case was not moot because the litigation proceeded in a class-wide posture and the challenged rule continued to affect similarly situated ex-felons and state election administration.
- The Court reversed the California Supreme Court.
- The Court held that California’s felon disenfranchisement scheme, as applied to individuals who had completed sentence and parole, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
- The Court relied on Fourteenth Amendment § 2’s reference to denial of voting rights “for participation in rebellion, or other crime” as constitutional authorization for disenfranchisement on that basis.
- The Court rejected applying the usual strict-scrutiny/compelling-interest framework to felon disenfranchisement because § 2 contemplates exclusion from the franchise for “other crime.”

## Legal Principles

- Fourteenth Amendment § 2 is read as affirmatively permitting states to disenfranchise individuals for “rebellion, or other crime.”
- Because the Fourteenth Amendment expressly contemplates disenfranchisement for crime, felon disenfranchisement does not, by itself, trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
- A class-wide declaratory-type ruling affecting election administration and unnamed class members can preserve a live controversy for appellate review despite some officials’ acquiescence.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld California’s denial of the vote to persons convicted of felonies even after completion of sentence and parole, concluding that Fourteenth Amendment § 2 authorizes disenfranchisement for “other crime” and therefore the scheme did not violate equal protection.


Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)