## Facts

- Sally Richardson sued her ex-husband, Michael Richardson, in South Dakota circuit court for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- Before the relationship, Sally had worked part-time as an escort; Michael initially contacted her by phone as a potential client.
- After the two began dating and later married, Sally alleged she stopped escorting but that Michael insisted she resume.
- Sally alleged Michael supplied a cellphone and business cards, advertised her online, drove her to appointments, and monitored her encounters through a laptop or iPad.
- Sally alleged that Michael became physically and verbally abusive early in the relationship, repeatedly threatened to kill Sally or himself, and attempted suicide in January 2014.
- Sally alleged that when she tried to stop escorting, Michael became violent, and that he emotionally, physically, and sexually abused her, causing humiliation, serious health problems, and severe emotional distress.
- Sally and Michael divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
- The divorce judgment included a stipulation reserving Sally’s right to bring “other nonproperty causes of action” against Michael.
- Michael moved to dismiss the civil complaint under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5) (failure to state a claim), relying on *Pickering v. Pickering*, which had held IIED was unavailable when based on conduct that led to dissolution of a marriage.
- The circuit court concluded it was bound by *Pickering* and dismissed Sally’s IIED claim; Sally appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether South Dakota law bars a former spouse’s IIED claim as a matter of public policy when the alleged conduct occurred during the marriage and contributed to the divorce, under *Pickering v. Pickering*.
2. Whether, taking the complaint’s allegations as true, Sally stated a legally sufficient IIED claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of South Dakota overruled *Pickering v. Pickering*’s categorical rule barring marital-context IIED claims tied to the breakdown of the marriage.
- The court held that public-policy concerns cited in *Pickering* did not justify a blanket prohibition on IIED claims between former spouses for severe, intentional abuse.
- Applying the Rule 12(b)(5) standard and accepting the pleaded facts as true, the court held Sally alleged conduct that could qualify as extreme and outrageous and could cause severe emotional distress.
- The court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A former spouse is not categorically barred from bringing an IIED claim based on conduct occurring during the marriage, even if the conduct also related to the marital breakdown and divorce.
- Courts should not create a broad immunity from tort liability for severe marital misconduct through a blanket public-policy rule.
- On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks only whether the plaintiff could obtain relief under any set of provable facts consistent with the complaint.
- IIED requires: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress (or reckless disregard of that risk), (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress; whether conduct meets the “extreme and outrageous” standard is commonly fact dependent.
- A divorce judgment’s reservation of “nonproperty causes of action” can preserve the ability to bring a later tort suit, with ordinary preclusion and release doctrines addressing any overlap between divorce-related matters and civil tort claims.

## Conclusion

*Richardson v. Richardson* rejected *Pickering*’s categorical public-policy bar on IIED claims between former spouses arising from marital conduct, held that Sally’s allegations of being forced into prostitution and subjected to severe abuse were sufficient at the pleading stage, and reversed and remanded so the IIED claim could proceed.


Richardson v. Richardson, 906 N.W.2d 369 (2017)