Facts
- John Paul Stevenson was prosecuted in Virginia for murder after multiple prior proceedings, including a conviction reversed on evidentiary grounds and two mistrials.
- At Stevenson’s fourth trial, defense counsel moved to close the courtroom to the press and public under a state statute allowing exclusion of persons whose presence would impair a fair trial.
- The prosecutor did not object, and the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed, citing concerns about protecting the defendant’s rights.
- Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and two reporters sought to vacate the closure order and argued that closure required a determination that no reasonable alternative would protect fair-trial interests.
- The trial judge declined to reopen the proceedings and continued the trial with the press and public excluded.
- The next day, the trial court struck the prosecution’s evidence, dismissed the jury, and entered a judgment of not guilty.
- After the acquittal, the trial court granted the newspaper’s motion to intervene retroactively; the Virginia Supreme Court declined relief.
- The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed and reversed.
Issues
- Whether closing a criminal trial to the public and press on a generalized fair-trial rationale violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
- Whether the First Amendment protects a public and press right of access to attend criminal trials.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed and held the closure order unconstitutional.
- A majority concluded the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects a right of the public and press to attend criminal trials.
- The Court recognized a strong presumption that criminal trials are open.
- The Court held closure is permissible only when an overriding interest is identified and supported by specific findings on the record.
- The trial court’s generalized reliance on fair-trial concerns, without concrete findings and without consideration of alternatives, was insufficient to justify excluding the press and public.
Legal Principles
- Criminal trials are presumptively open to the public and press under the First Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Openness is supported by a long Anglo-American tradition of public criminal trials and by the checking function public attendance serves in the administration of justice.
- Closure of a criminal trial is not categorically forbidden, but it requires an overriding interest that is articulated through specific, reviewable findings.
- Generalized assertions that closure may protect fair-trial interests do not overcome the presumption of openness.
Conclusion
The Court held that the First Amendment secures a presumptive right of the public and press to attend criminal trials, and that a courtroom may be closed only upon a specifically supported finding of an overriding interest sufficient to justify exclusion.