## Facts

- David J. Riffle and Shirley I. Riffle (now Miller) married in 1988 and separated in August 2012.
- During the divorce proceedings, David sought domestic-violence protection, resulting in an emergency protective order.
- The family court later dismissed the domestic-violence matter and entered a mutual no-contact order, limiting contact except as needed for court proceedings.
- On February 19, 2013, the family court entered an agreed final divorce order that again included a mutual restraining (no-contact) provision.
- In May 2013, David sought to hold Shirley in contempt for alleged violations of the mutual order, including leaving a voicemail and asking a third party to contact David.
- The family court found Shirley in contempt and offered to forgo sanctions if she had no contact with David for two years.
- Shirley appealed to the circuit court, challenging the contempt ruling and the inclusion of the mutual restraining order in the divorce decree.
- The circuit court reversed the inclusion of the mutual restraining order, finding no proper evidentiary basis of mutual abuse supporting such an order.
- David appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing the circuit court’s action was erroneous and impaired a claimed contractual agreement reflected in the divorce order.

## Issues

1. Whether a court may include a mutual domestic-violence protective/restraining order in a divorce decree absent petitions by both parties and proof by a preponderance of the evidence as required by W. Va. Code § 48-27-507.
2. Whether removing the mutual restraining order improperly impaired a party’s asserted right to contract where the order was claimed to be an agreed term of the divorce resolution.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court.
- The Court held that a mutual protective/restraining order is prohibited unless each party files a domestic-violence petition against the other and proves the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Because the record lacked the required petitions and evidentiary findings supporting mutual domestic violence, the family court lacked authority to enter a mutual protective order under the statute.
- The Court rejected the contractual-rights argument, holding that private agreement cannot authorize a court to enter a statutorily unauthorized mutual protective order.

## Legal Principles

- Under W. Va. Code § 48-27-507, a court may not enter a mutual protective order unless each party (1) files a petition alleging domestic violence against the other and (2) establishes those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Statutory prerequisites for domestic-violence protective orders limit judicial authority; parties cannot confer authority by agreement or waive statutory safeguards through settlement terms.
- In family-court appeals, factual findings are reviewed for clear error, application of law to fact for abuse of discretion, and legal questions de novo.

## Conclusion

A mutual domestic-violence protective or restraining order in a divorce decree is invalid absent statutorily required petitions and proof by both parties, and an asserted agreement between spouses cannot justify entry of an order the statute prohibits.


Riffle v. Riffle, 774 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 2015)